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Privacy Perils of Open Data and Data Sharing: A Case 
Study of Taiwan's Open Data Policy and Practices 
Ching-Yi Liu†, Wei-Ping Li††, & Yun-Pu Tu††† 
Abstract: Governments and private sector players have hopped on the 
open data train in the past few years. Both the governments and civil society in 
Taiwan are exploring the opportunities provided by the data stored in public and 
private sectors. While they have been enjoying the benefits of the sharing and 
flowing of data among various databases, the government and some players in 
the private sectors have also posed tremendous privacy challenges by 
inappropriately gathering and processing personal data. The amended Personal 
Data Protection Act was originally enacted as a regulatory mechanism to protect 
personal data and create economic benefits via enhancing the uses of public and 
private sector data. In reality, the Act has instead resulted in harm to Taiwan’s 
data privacy situation in this big data era. This article begins with an overview 
of the Taiwan’s open data policy history and its current practices. Next, the 
article analyzes cases in which the data sharing practices between different 
sectors have given rise to privacy controversies, with a particular focus on 2020, 
when Taiwan used data surveillance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Finally, this article flags problems related to an open data system, including the 
protection of sensitive data, de-identification, the right to consent and opt-out, 
and the ambiguity of “public interest,” and concludes by proposing a feasible 
architecture for the implementation of a more sensible open data system with 
privacy-enhancing characteristics. 
Cite as: Ching-Yi Liu et al., Privacy Perils of Open Data and Data 
Sharing: A Case Study of Taiwan's Open Data Policy and Practices, 30 WASH. 
INT’L L.J. 545 (2021). 
INTRODUCTION 
Issues surrounding big data, artificial intelligence, and 
data privacy, are among the most popular topics in today’s privacy 
law scholarship.1 For example, the Special Rapporteur on the right 
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1  See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012); 
Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, Privacy as Safety, 95 WASH. L. REV. 141 (2020); 
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); Harry Surden, 
Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605 (2007). For discussion of various data 
privacy issues, see, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Limitless Worker Surveillance, 
106 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (2017); Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection, 
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to privacy by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) has discussed many of these issues 
in detail.2 Privacy, a primary fundamental human right recognized 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is 
the right to control one’s personal information by deciding how 
their information is collected and used.3 For individuals, a breach 
of personal information poses a potential threat to identity theft.4 
For organizations, the unauthorized collection and inadequate 
processing of personal data may create a tremendous risk of 
lawsuits or penalties. For example, the California Consumer 
Privacy Act (CCPA) in the U.S. grants data subjects a private right 
of action if a company that keeps subjects’ unencrypted and 
unredacted information fails to implement reasonable procedures 
to protect the subjects’ personal information, and a breach results 
from the company’s failure.5 
There are multiple regulatory restrictions and legal 
frameworks in place for safeguarding the right to data privacy. The 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)6 
and the United States’ Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) 7  and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLB)8 are perhaps the regulations that have attracted most of the 
 
26 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 229 (2020); Lilian Edwards, Privacy, Security and Data 
Protection in Smart Cities; A Critical EU Law Perspective, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 28 
(2016); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, 
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Erin Murphy & Jun H. Tong, The 
Racial Composition of Forensic DNA Databases, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1847 (2020); Frank 
Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1917 (2019); 
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
2  See generally Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, OHCHR, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/privacy/sr/pages/srprivacyindex.aspx (last visited April 
11, 2021). 
3  Clément Perarnaud, Privacy and Data Protection, GIP DIGITAL WATCH, 
https://dig.watch/issues/privacy-and-data-protection (last visited April 11, 2021). 
4  Ryan Brooks, Data Privacy Trends, Issues and Concerns, NETWRIX (April 8, 
2021), https://blog.netwrix.com/2019/11/05/data-privacy-trends-issues-and-concerns-for-
2020/; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
5  Id. 
6  See generally General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 2016 O.J. (L119), 
https://gdpr-info.eu/ (last visited April 11, 2021). 
7  See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
8  See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 6821–6827 (1999). 
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attention over the past few years.9 More recently, novel but thorny 
issues arising out of the need to manage the COVID-19 pandemic 
have challenged data governance and regulation around the 
world. 10  The pandemic created a growing urgency for 
governments to track and surveil their citizens in the name of 
public health, which in turn impacted individual autonomy and the 
right to data privacy.11  
The past decade preceding the pandemic also witnessed a 
wave of open data initiatives. 12  More governments and 
corporations embraced the idea of “open data,” which has been 
described as “accessible public data that people, companies, and 
organizations can use to launch new ventures, analyze patterns 
and trends, make data-driven decisions, and solve complex 
problems.”13 By adopting open data initiatives, governments and 
corporations have released raw data sets that are collected, stored, 
and buried deep in databases to the public.14 Open data initiatives 
have rendered government records more accessible to the public, 
encouraged technological innovation, increased economic 
 
9  See Jonathan Keane, From California to Brazil: Europe’s Privacy Laws Have 
Created a Recipe for the World, CNBC (Apr. 8, 2021 1:32 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/08/from-california-to-brazil-gdpr-has-created-recipe-for-
the-world.html; Leonard Wills, A Very Brief Introduction on Cybersecurity 
Regulations/Standards: Part 1, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.americanba
r.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-trial-lawyer/practice/2020/a-very-brief-
introduction-on-cybersecurity-regulations-standards-1/.  
10  See generally Chuan-Feng Wu, COVID-19 and Democratic Governance in 
Taiwan: Challenges and Opportunities, U.S.-ASIA LAW INSTITUTE (Jan. 28, 2021), 
https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/covid-19-and-democratic-governance-in-taiwan-
challenges-and-opportunities.  
11  Joseph A. Cannataci (The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy), 
Preliminary Evaluation of the Privacy Dimensions of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-
19) Pandemic Report, U.N. Doc. A/75/147 (2020). 
12  See e.g., White House Open Data Initiatives, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/open (last visited Nov.18, 2020); State of New York 
Open Data, STATE OF NEW YORK (2020), https://data.ny.gov/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020); 
City of Chicago Data Portal, CITY OF CHICAGO (2020), https://data.cityofchicago.org/ (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2020); see also Amy Harmon, As Public Records Go Online, Some Say 
They're Too Public, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/24/ny
region/as-public-records-go-online-some-say-they-re-too-public.html; Jan Whittington et 
al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in Municipal Open Government, 
30 BERKELEY TECH. & L.J. 1899, 1913 (2015).  
13
  JOEL GURIN, OPEN DATA NOW: THE SECRET TO HOT STARTUPS, SMART 
INVESTING, SAVVY MARKETING, AND FAST INNOVATION 9 (2014). 
14  See, e.g., Markus Perkmann & Henri Schildt, Open Data Partnerships Between 
Firms and Universities: The Role of Boundary Organizations, 44 RSCH. POL’Y 1133, 
1134–35 (2015). 
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development, and motivated civic engagement.15 However, the 
open data initiatives have also received criticism. Some critics 
question whether this data use is appropriate and whether a single 
reckless act could cost data subjects’ privacy interests, for instance, 
cases have shown that individuals still can be identified by 
combining de-identified heath records and voter registration 
records.16 Privacy interests must be considered when making open 
data policies. A comprehensive data protection program is the key 
to fulfilling promises that open data advocates have envisioned. 
Although “the right to privacy” is not enumerated in 
Taiwan’s Constitution, the Constitutional Court of Taiwan has 
long recognized the right to privacy as an indispensable 
fundamental right and thus protected under Article 22 of the 
Constitution for purposes of preserving human dignity.17 Recent 
data privacy controversies in Taiwan exemplify the need for a 
more thoughtful and comprehensive privacy protection 
mechanism. The Taiwanese government and civil society have 
explored the opportunities provided by data stored in both the 
public and the private sectors since 2009.18 While the sharing and 
flowing of data among various benefits has created numerous 
benefits, 19  there are some downsides. Some government and 
 
15  See generally BEN GREEN, THE SMART ENOUGH CITY (2019) (ebook); BEYOND 
TRANSPARENCY (Brett Goldstein et al. eds., 2013); BETH SIMONE NOVECK, SMART 
CITIZENS, SMARTER STATES (2015); SMART CITIES CYBERSECURITY AND PRIVACY (Danda 
B. Rawat & Kayhan Zrar Ghafoor eds., 2018); HOW SMART IS YOUR CITY? 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, ETHICS AND INCLUSIVENESS (Maria Isabel Aldinhas 
Ferreira ed., 2020). 
16  See, e.g., BEN GREEN ET AL., OPEN DATA PRIVACY 3 (2017); Arthur P.B. 
Laudrain, Smart-City Technologies, Government Surveillance & Privacy, Assessing the 
Potential for Chilling Effects and Existing Safeguards in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 3 (Aug. 7, 2019) (unpublished 
article) (on file with Leiden University Grotius Center for International Legal Studies); see 
also Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 16 (2013); Ben Green et al., Open Data Privacy: A Risk-benefit, Process-oriented 
Approach to Sharing and Protecting Municipal Data, BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER FOR 
INTERNET & SOCIETY (2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/30340010/Ope
nDataPrivacy.pdf 
17  See Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 603 (Sept. 28, 2005) (Taiwan). 
18  See, e.g., MEI-CHUN LEE & PO-YU TSENG, OPEN CULTURE FOUNDATION, 
TAIWAN 2014–2016 OPEN GOVERNMENT REPORT 2 (2017), 
https://opengovreport.ocf.tw/assets/pdf/report-en.pdf. 
19  For example, during a disastrous dust explosion happened in Taipei in 2015, the 
Taipei municipal government released the data of casualties and aid shortage to the public. 
With the shared data, the tech community and the government collaborated to establish 
systems to allocate and coordinate aid resources. Id. at 56. 
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private sector actors intend to capitalize on this data usage and 
pose tremendous privacy risks to Taiwanese people by 
inappropriately gathering and processing personal data. The 
Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) was originally enacted to 
serve as the ultimate regulatory foundation for protecting personal 
data in 1995, when it passed as the Computer-Processed Personal 
Data Protection Act.20 However, the PDPA has not only failed to 
sufficiently protect personal data, but it has in fact worsened the 
data privacy landscape in Taiwan. Further, the PDPA’s articles are 
outdated, having not been substantially amended since 2015.21 
The law is also lacking several important privacy protection 
concepts, such as the right to opt-out, the right to be forgotten, and 
data portability, all of which are concerns internationally.22  
This article focuses on open data policy’s development in 
Taiwan and provides a critical analysis of the potential downsides 
to its privacy scheme. Part I begins with an overview of taiwan’s 
open data initiatives and current practices. Part II analyzes specific 
case studies where the data sharing practices in different sectors 
have resulted in privacy erosions. Part III concludes with feasible 
solutions for implementing a more sensible open data system with 
privacy-enhancing characteristics. 
II. OPEN DATA AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN TAIWAN 
A. The History of Open Data and the PDPA 
In 2005, the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s legislative body, 
passed the Freedom of Government Information Law (FOGIL), 
 
20  See GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 162, 171–72 (2014). 
21  GeRen ZihLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
(promulgated by NAT’L DEV. COUNCIL, Aug. 11, 1995, effective Aug. 11, 1995) (Taiwan) 
(the amendment 2019 only amend the relevant matters set out in § 53 and § 55 pertaining 
to “The Ministry of Justice” shall be handled by “The National Development Council” as 
governing body).  
22  See, e.g., Oskar Josef Gstrein, Right to be Forgotten: European Data 
Imperialism, National Privilege, or Universal Human Right?, 13 REV. OF EUR. 
ADMIN. L. 125, 128 (2020); Chang Chih-Wei, Remember, Forget or Be Forgotten on the 
Internet: Review the Personal Data Protection in the Digital Age Based on the Decision of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union Regarding the Right to be 
Forgotten,148 CHENGCHI L. REV. 1, 5 (2017); see also Gabriel Nicholas, Taking It with 
You: Platform Barriers to Entry and the Limits of Data Portability 1–5 (Mar. 6, 2020) 
(unpublished article) (on file with Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law 
Review). 
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which serves as the legal basis for citizens who want to request 
information from the government. 23  However, the open data 
initiative did not take root until 2009, when several groups in civil 
society promoted open data policies. For example, the Association 
of Digital Culture brought society’s attention to the power of data 
during a deadly typhoon disaster in August 2009. 24  The 
Association collected information released by the government to 
coordinate rescue missions, which helped to rapidly allocate 
resources to people in need.25  
The demand for open data in Taiwan continued to grow 
and attracted more people to explore the potential of data. For 
example, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster 26  spurred 
Taiwanese concerns about the safety of Taiwan’s nuclear power 
plants and electricity supply.27 Consequently, a group of hackers 
and experts who possessed electricity generation data began 
investigating Taiwan’s electricity issues and released data to the 
public that had long been kept in the Taiwan Power Company’s 
private database.28  
Meanwhile, some Taiwanese government ministers 
attempted to map out strategies and formulate policies of open 
government and open data after witnessing the efforts of civil 
groups and open government initiatives in other countries, 
particularly the United States.29 In November 2012, the Executive 
Yuan, the executive branch of Taiwan’s central government, 
 
23  See Taiwan Freedom of Information Overview, FREEDOMINFO.ORG, 
http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/east-asia/taiwan/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2020). 
24  Li Bo-Yu (李 柏 昱), FangZai 2.0 Jhuanti (Wu): TsShun JhuKon 
GuanMinHeZhuoLi [防災 2.0專題(五): 資訊志工 官民合作力] [Disaster Prevention 2.0: 
Information Volunteers; The Government and the People Work Together], PANSCI (2013), 
https://pansci.asia/archives/44612. 
25  Id. 
26  In March 2011, an earthquake caused a nuclear reactor meltdown in the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. See generally RICHARD J. SAMUELS, 
3.11: DISASTER AND CHANGE IN JAPAN (2013). 
27  Ko Shu-Ling, Taiwan, Japan Share Atomic Power Dilemma, THE JAPAN TIMES 
(Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/11/national/taiwan-japan-
share-atomic-power-dilemma/. 
28  See Jonathan Stray, How Does a Country Get to Open Data? What Taiwan Can 
Teach Us About the Evolution of Access, NIEMAN LAB (April 10, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2013/04/how-does-a-country-get-to-open-data-what-taiwan-
can-teach-us-about-the-evolution-of-access/. 
29  LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 7. 
JUNE 2021 PRIVACY PERILS OF OPEN DATA 551 
passed a resolution to promote open data nationwide. 30  The 
resolution was subsequently followed by further regulations and 
guidelines, including the “Open Government Data Operating 
Principle for Agencies of the Executive Yuan,” and the 
“Regulations for the Use of the Government Open Data 
Platform.” 31  The official open data portal website, 32  which 
deposits all available data from Taiwanese central and local 
governments, has been online since April 2013.33 On this website, 
central and local governments as well as individuals and private 
sector groups are able to share data sets.34 As of November 20, 
2020, there are 47,747 datasets available on this website.35  In 
addition, the central government has encouraged companies to 
utilize government data and engage in projects that promote the 
public interest. 36  The “Google Taiwan Natural Disaster 
Management Plan” is a noticeable public interest promoting 
project. As suggested by the name of the plan, it is a Google 
product that uses data from different departments of the central 
government to map out any natural disasters on the island in a real-
time manner.37  
Some Taiwanese local governments that witnessed this 
open data trend responded by creating their own open data 
 
30  The Premier and government ministers at this meeting recognized the 
importance of being transparent with government information and decided to formulate 
regulations on opening data to the public; Minutes of the 3322nd Executive Yuan Meeting 
Resolution (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/4EC2394BE4EE9DD0/1cd200d2-
f113-4932-a993-8811bbc3d6fd . 
31  XingZhengYuan Ji SuoShu GeJiJ Guan JhengFu ZihLiao KaiFang ZuoYeh 
YuanZe (行政院及所屬各級機關政府資料開放作業原則) [Open Government Data 
Operating Principle for Agencies of the Executive Yuan] (promulgated on Feb. 23, 2013); 
JhengFu ZihLiao KaiFang PingTai ZihLiao ShihYong GueiFan (政府資料開放平臺資料
使用規範) [Regulations for the Use of the Government Open Data Platform].  
32  See DATA.GOV.TW, https://data.gov.tw/. 
33  See generally Shian Ging (項靖), KaiFang ZihLiao JiChiDuei JhengFu JhihLi 
Yu GeRenYinSih YingSiang Jhih YanJiou (開放資料及其對政府治理與個人隱私影響之
研究) [The Influence of Open Data on Government Governance and Individual Privacy], 
TAIWAN E-GOVERNANCE RESEARCH CENTER (2015).  
34  See About Us, OPEN DATA PLATFORM, https://data.gov.tw/en/about (last visited 
May 28, 2021). 
35  See DATA.GOV.TW, supra note 32. 
36  See, e.g., Jhuang Yin-Jyh, Open Government Data Strategy and Outlook in 
Taiwan, 14 ARCHIVE Q. 22, 24. 
37  See Google Taiwan Disaster Information Platform, DATA.GOV.TW, 
http://data.gov.tw/node/8170 (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
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initiatives.38 Taipei City Government was the first among local 
government to make its data accessible on a local data platform, 
“Data.Taipei.”39 On “Data.Taipei,” the Taipei City Government 
outlines the goals of the website, including to provide citizens 
easier access to government data, to enhance the transparency and 
efficiency of the city government, and to promote the data’s value-
added application. 40  Other local governments, including New 
Taipei City, Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Taoyuan, have also 
begun building their own open data websites. 41  In 2018, the 
governments from these six special municipalities became the first 
Asian cities to sign the Open Data Charter (ODC). 42  Local 
associations have taken actions to facilitate open data initiatives 
too. In 2013, the Taipei Computer Association established the 
Open Data Alliance, an example of nongovernmental advocacy 
for open data.43 
The Executive Yuan named 2015 as the first year to 
actively promote open data and big data usage.44 That same year, 
Taiwan also received recognition as the top open data country on 
the Global Open Data Index, 45  which greatly emphasized 
Taiwan’s progress in the field of open data at the central and local 
 
38  See Nieh Ting-Yu (聶廷宇), YiQiLai WaJue YinCang zai ZiLiao zhong di XunXi 
(一起來挖掘隱藏在資料中的訊息) [Let’s Excavate the Information Hidden in the Data 
Together], GOVERNMENT RESEARCH BULLETIN (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.grb.gov.tw/s
earch/report/12991480.  
39  Shian, supra note 33. 
40  See DATA.TAIPEI, https://data.taipei/#/about/aboutus. 
41  See Yang Tung-Mou & Wu Yi-Jung, The Maturity Assessment of the Recent 
Open Data Development in the Context of Taiwan E-Government, 56 J. OF EDUC. MEDIA 
& LIB. SCI. 7, 30 (2019). 
42  See Taiwan City’s Open Data Grabs First Place in Asia, NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (July 31, 2017), https://www.ndc.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n
=114AAE178CD95D4C&sms=DF717169EA26F1A3&s=BEFA5CB8BDC7E2A6%E3%
80%82. 
43  See Su Wen-Bin (蘇文彬), GuoNei ChengLi Open Data LianMeng TueiDong 
KaiFang ZihLiao YingYong FaJhan (國內成立 Open Data聯盟推動開放資料應用發展) 
[The Open Data Alliance Was Established in Taiwan to Promote the Development of Open 
Data Applications], ITHOME (Sept. 14, 2013), https://www.ithome.com.tw/node/82633 . 
44  Zhonghua Minguo Xingzeng Yuan [Executive Yuan of R.O.C.], MaoKuei: 
CiDong Open Data ShenHua YingYong YuanNian JiaSu ShihChu JengFu ZihLiao (毛揆：
啟動 Open Data深化應用元年 加速釋出政府資料) [Premier Mao: Launching the First 
Year of Deepening the Application of Open Data to Accelerate the Release of Government 
Data], EXECUTIVE YUAN (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD
91/bb1dd1b5-f098-4ed0-8e88-8ab2e9764a03. 
45  See generally LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 29. 
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government levels. To accelerate the release of data, the Executive 
Yuan required every department to establish a consulting 
committee dedicated to open data matters.46 By mid-2015, more 
than 30 committees were implemented throughout most of the 
departments under the Executive Yuan. 47  The committees are 
composed of members from both the government and private 
sectors, and they are responsible for reviewing the data releasing 
process in each department.48  
However, discussions about open data policies among 
government and private sector participants still failed to include a 
comprehensive privacy protection framework. 49  Nor were any 
sufficiently detailed instructions or regulatory efforts put forth to 
protect personal data during the process of data disclosure. 50 
Although there have been governmental efforts to incorporate 
personal privacy guidelines, 51  the existing Open Government 
Data Principle and pertinent administrative regulations only 
provide government agencies with general guidelines when 
government employees use and process data. Whenever 
controversies about personal data protection arise, government 
agencies mostly rely on the PDPA to justify their data gathering, 
processing, and reuse practices. 52  Unfortunately, the PDPA 
remains a regulatory regime with multiple flaws. 
 
46  Advanced Strategies for Government Open Data Action, NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, http://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=B2A92523DCC1
2607. 
47  Global Open Data Index 2015 – Taiwan Insight, OPEN KNOWLEDGE 
FOUNDATION (Dec. 16, 2015), https://blog.okfn.org/2015/12/16/global-open-data-index-
2015-taiwan-index/ 
48  DATA.TAIPEI, supra note 40. 
49  See e.g., LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 7–8.  
50  CHEN SHUN-LIN (陳舜伶) ET AL., Cang Zhi yu Min: KaiFang ZhengFu ZiLiao 
de YuanZe yu XianKuang(藏智於民: 開放政府資料的原則與現況) [Empowering 
Citizens with Data: An Open Government Data Handbook] 8–9 (Research Center for 
Information Technology at Academia Sinica Jan. 2013).  
51  The “Open Government Data Operating Principle for Agencies of the Executive 
Yuan” (the primary guidelines for government agency, amended in 2019) provides an 
example. There are only two items in the Principle related to privacy and personal data: 
Point 5 & Point 15. It also suggests that the PDPA and the Cyber Security Management Act 
are the only laws necessary to comply with when processing personal data.  
52  See generally GeZiFa Wen yu Da (個資法問與答) [Personal Information 
Questions and Answers], NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, https://pipa.ndc.gov.tw/Ne
ws.aspx?n=7D3602579D2BF23F&sms=2F28806F8A42AE16 (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
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The PDPA was originally enacted as the Computer-
Processed Personal Data Protection Law (CPPDPL), in 1995.53 To 
help garner support from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, the Legislative Yuan enacted the CPPDPL to guarantee to 
the World Trade Organization that Taiwan would provide 
appropriate privacy protection for personal data.54 As its name 
suggests, the CPPDPL only applied to data processed by 
computers.55 Therefore, this law did not require data collectors or 
processors to specify why they were collecting, processing, or 
using data, nor did it ask data collectors or processors to de-
identify the data.56 The CPPDPL was eventually replaced by the 
PDPA in 2010, where the legislators vowed to grant greater rights 
to individuals to control their own personal data and require data 
collectors and processors to provide more protections.57 
Nevertheless, the insufficient data privacy protection 
guidelines issued by the Executive Yuan and the PDPA have 
resulted in several controversies that have further increased legal 
uncertainties. 58  These uncertainties cause concerns for both 
citizens who may be uncomfortable about their personal data 
being disclosed and for civil servants responsible for handling 
personal data daily.59 A 2017 survey showed that more than 80% 
 
53  See Robin Winkler, Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Act, 
WINKLER PARTNERS (Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.winklerpartners.com/?p=987. 
54  See generally Liu Zuo-Kuo (劉佐國), WoGuo GeRen ZiLiao YinSi QuanYi zhi 
BaoHu—Lun “DianNao ChuLi GeRen ZiLiao BaoHu Fa” zhi LiFa yu XiuFa GuoCheng 
(我國個人資料隱私權益之保護—論「電腦處理個人資料保護法」之立法與修法過
程) [The Protection of the Interests of Data Privacy in Taiwan—The Course of the 
Legislation and the Amendment of the Personal Information Protection Act], TAIPEI BAR J. 
42, 44–51 (2005). 
55  See Chen-Hung Chang, Eyes on the Road Program in Taiwan―Information 
Privacy Issues under the Taiwan Personal Data Protection Act, 31 MARSHALL J. INFO. 
TECH. & PRIVACY L. 145, 151 (2014). 
56  See generally Yung-Hua Kuo & Po-Liang Chen, Identity Laws and Privacy 
Protection in a Modern State: The Legal History Concerning Personal Information in 
Taiwan (1895–2015), 25 WASH. INT'L L.J. 223, 245 (2016). 
57  Chang, supra note 55, at 152. 
58  See generally Shian, supra note 33. 
59  See Liao Zhou-Peng et al., (廖洲棚、廖興中、黃心怡), Kaifang Jhengfu 
Fuwu Ce lyue Yansi Diaocha: Jhengfu Zihliao Kaifang Yingyong Moshih Pinggu Yu 
Minjhong Canyu Gonggong Jhengce Yiyuan Diaocha (開放政府服務策略研析調查：政
府資料開放應用模式評估與民眾參與公共政策意願調查) [Research and Analysis on 
Open Government Service Strategy: Evaluation of Government Data Open Application 
model and Public Participation in Public Policy Willingness Survey], NAT’L DEV. 
COUNCIL (2017), https://www.teg.org.tw/files/research/. 
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of civil servants believe the current law is insufficient for handling 
open data duties, while private citizens agree that it is reasonable 
for the government to restrict the usage of open data to protect 
privacy.60  
For years, Taiwan’s civil society and government have 
endeavored to excavate data stored within the government and 
private companies and tried to capitalize on the potential of such 
data. 61  Nevertheless, a comprehensive privacy protection 
framework remains absent from the process of opening data.62 
PDPA flaws discussed below demonstrate how it may fail to 
protect citizens’ privacy when data subjects’ information is being 
shared. 
B. Key Controversies Raised by the PDPA 
1. The protection of sensitive data. — The PDPA provides 
more data protections than any previous Taiwanese legislation. 
For example, the PDPA extends privacy protection to all data, 
whether it is stored in computers, in print, or processed in both 
government agencies and private sectors.63 Moreover, the PDPA 
mandates that under most circumstances, data collectors should 
inform data subjects of collection purposes and obtain consent 
from the subjects.64 The law also distinguishes between “general 
personal data” versus “sensitive personal data,” which includes 
medical records, healthcare data, genetics information, sex life 
data, physical examination reports, and criminal records. 65 
Nevertheless, because Article 6 of the PDPA required stronger 
protection of “sensitive personal data” and other strict regulations, 
it faced fierce opposition from the private sector because “it would 
cause tremendous hardships for corporations to abide by the law” 
 
60  The survey question is: “on a scale from 1[strongly disagree] to 5[strongly 
agree], indicate how you agree or disagree with the following statement: To protect privacy, 
it is reasonable that the government imposes restrictions on data accessibility.” The average 
score of the surveyed participants was 3.95. Id. at 198. 
61  See LEE & TSENG, supra note 18, at 31–52 (noting Taiwan’s open data cases). 
62  See, e.g., Shian, supra note 33; see also Open Culture Foundation, supra 
note 18. 
63  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act], 
ch. I, art. 2. 
64  Id. arts. 6–7. 
65  Id. art. 6. 
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should it be implemented.66 As a consequence, this contentious 
Article and the other articles related to its enforcement were 
suspended, leading to the amendments in 2015.67 
Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice claimed that the purpose of 
the 2015 amendment was to “keep [the law] up with the current 
social circumstances.”68 For instance, under the amended PDPA, 
“written consent” is no longer required for the collection of 
personal data, unless it is sensitive data.69 This means that even 
implicit words of consent, verbal or written, can meet the PDPA 
consent requirement. 70  The Ministry of Justice reasoned that 
relaxing the consent requirements could ease the potential 
administrative burdens on government agencies and save costs for 
private sector actors. 71  Civil society groups such as Taiwan 
Association of Human Rights disagreed and criticized this clause 
and other aspects of the amendment, arguing that the Ministry of 
Justice was trading individuals’ rights to privacy for convenience 
and benefits for data collectors and processors.72 The amended 
PDPA not only fell short of many individuals’ expectations of 
closing the loopholes in data protection laws, but it also increased 
risks of privacy violations. The following scenarios exemplify 
 
66  See Chang Jin-Hao (張景皓), GeZihSiouFa DaZhueiZong SanJenYi TiaoWen 
RenDai LiFaYuan ShenYi (個資修法大追蹤 3爭議條文仍待立法院審議) [Tracking the 
Amendment of the Personal Data Protection Act: Three Controversial Articles Are Waiting 
to Be Deliberated by the Legislative Yuan], ITHOME (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.ithome
.com.tw/node/82912. 
67  Huang Yen-Fen (黃 彥 棻), FaWuBu: GeZihFa SiouJhengAn ZueiKuai 
MingNian San Yue ShihShih (法務部：個資法修正案最快明年三月實施) [Ministry of 
Justice: The Amended Personal Information Protection Act Will Be Effective in March at 
the Earliest], ITHOME (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.ithome.com.tw/news/101614; Lu Yi-
Rong, The Ministry of Justice "reverses" Personal Information May No Longer be 
Protected, JOURNALIST (June 25, 2020), https://www.new7.com.tw/NewsView.aspx?t=&i
=TXT201506171714196B2. 
68  Huang, supra note 67. 
69  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act], 
ch. I, art. 7. 
70  Id. 
71  FaWuBu dui GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa BuFen TiaoWen XiuZheng ShuoMing 
(法務部對個人資料保護法部分條文修正說明) [Ministry of Justice Explanation to The 
Amendments of The Personal Information Protection Act], art. 7 (2015). 
72  See Chiou Wen-Tsong (邱文聰), Chihluo de Guomin yu Duntianrudi 
Wusuobuneng de Jhengfu (赤裸的國民與遁天入地無所不能的政府) [The Naked 
Citizens and the Omnipotent Government that Could Traverse Across the Sky as Well as 
the Earth], LIBERTY TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/942381. 
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how the amendments may put data subjects at privacy risks in 
open data cases. 
2. De-identification. — Although the purpose of the 
PDPA is to protect personal data, the law only addresses the issue 
of de-identification in a general way. De-identification refers to 
the process used to prevent someone's personal identity from 
being revealed.73 The 2015 amendment merely requires that when 
government agencies or academic institutions reuse data for any 
purpose other than that for which it was originally collected, they 
must de-identify the data so that the information will not lead to 
the identification of a specific data subject. 74  The PDPA’s 
Enforcement Rules promulgated under the Ministry of Justice 
further elaborated on the de-identification process, stating that the 
“data may not lead to the identification of a specific data 
subject.” 75  The Enforcement Rules then provide that 
deidentification “shall mean the personal data [be] replaced with 
codes” and a data subject’s name shall be “deleted … partially 
concealed, or processed via other means to the extent that the data 
subject may not be directly identified.”76  
However, these enforcement rules do not provide any 
guidance regarding the extent to which the data should be 
deidentified or how much personal information should be 
removed. This lack of guidance gives rise to thorny questions. For 
instance, is the de-identification considered strong enough if the 
data subject cannot be identified at the first glance of the 
information? Should the de-identification be irreversible so that 
the data subjects cannot be identified if their data is combined with 
other data sets?  
Another issue raised by the PDPA concerning de-
identification is the lack of guidance denoting who bears the 
responsibility of ensuring the process is done successfully. The 
relevant provisions discussing de-identification state that the 
 
73  See Joseph Jerome, De-Identification Should Be Relevant to a Privacy Law, But 
Not an Automatic Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://cdt.org/insights/de-identification-should-be-
relevant-to-a-privacy-law-but-not-an-automatic-get-out-of-jail-free-card/. 
74  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, arts. 6, 9; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19–20. 
75  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa ShiXing XiZe (個人資料保護法施行細則) 
[Enforcement Rules of the Personal Data Protection Act] art. 17. 
76  Id. 
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information “may not lead to the identification of a specific data 
subject” after its processing by the provider or from the disclosure 
by the collector,77 but no direction is given on who must complete 
this step. This ambiguity could result in further privacy disputes 
as both providers and collectors could theoretically shed the 
burden of de-identification under the statutory language. Without 
a clear understanding about whose responsibility it is to de-
identify the data, the actual de-identifying process could be 
delayed and result in further risks of privacy violations. 
3. The right to consent and opt-out. — Informed consent 
is an important mechanism for individuals to control the flow of 
their information. The 2010 PDPA amendment required data 
collectors to obtain written consent from data subjects under 
general circumstances. 78  However, to ease the burden on data 
collectors, particularly in situations where there are large volumes 
of data, the 2015 amendment lifted this requirement for written 
consent, except when collecting sensitive personal data.79 Now, 
when dealing with non-sensitive personal data, data collectors or 
providers do not need to obtain “written consents.”80  In other 
words, verbal consent, not written consent, is sufficient under 
these circumstances.81  
Data collectors or provides do not need to obtain any form 
of consent in other conditions, such as collecting data for a public 
interest purpose, academic research, or assisting government 
agencies. 82  From a data collectors’ perspective, the 2015 
amendment has removed the hurdle of obtaining consent when a 
large number of data subjects are involved, which is true in most 
open data initiatives. Data subjects, on the other hand, have gained 
 
77  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, arts. 6, 9; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19–20. 
78  See Huang Yen-Fen (黃彥棻), GeZihFa XiZe ChLu, GaoZhi yu ShuMian TonYi 
2 DaxianZhi FangKuan (個資法細則出爐，告知與書面同意 2 大限制放寬) [The 
Released Rules of PDPA, Relax the 2 Limitation to Inform and the Written Consent], 
ITHOME (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.ithome.com.tw/node/70655. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, art. 7; ch. II, arts. 15–16; ch. III, arts. 19–20. 
82  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, art. 6; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19, 20. 
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little while simultaneously losing the right to refuse their data 
from being used without clear consent. 
 Still worse, according to the PDPA, data subjects can 
only request their information be deleted or discontinued from 
processing or use when the specific purpose of data collection no 
longer exists or the dataset period expires. Except for the above 
situations, data subjects cannot choose to “opt-out” of the 
databases or programs. 83  
4. The ambiguity of “public interest.” — The term “public 
interest” appears repeatedly throughout the PDPA and serves as an 
exception for data collectors or providers to avoid certain legal 
obligations. For example, the PDPA mandates that a government 
agency shall only use personal data for the specific purpose of 
collection and within the necessary scope of its duty.84 However, 
Article 16 allows government agencies to use data for purposes 
other than the original purpose behind collecting the data if the use 
is for “public interest.”85 Other provisions in the PDPA also allow 
“public interest” exemptions, such as data uses for news reporting 
purposes.86 However, no explicit definition of “public interest” is 
given.  
Without a workable definition of “public interest,” there 
is no limit to the number of exemptions that could be invoked. 
Throughout Taiwan’s history, the government has often used 
“maintaining social order” and “promoting administrative 
efficiency” as justifications for policing its people.87 Therefore, 
the risk of data collectors or data processors excessively utilizing 
this “public interest” exemption may perhaps be even higher. 
When the Legislative Yuan passed the PDPA in 2010, 
legislators were aware of the possible controversies that might 
arise from the undefined term “public interest.”88 However, the 
legislators explicitly chose to keep the term undefined and instead 
made an “additional resolution” to deal with this issue when 
 
83  Id. ch. I, art. 11. 
84  Id. ch. II, art. 16. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. ch. I, arts. 6, 8–9; ch. III, arts. 19–20. 
87  See Kuo & Chen, supra note 56, at 259–60 (highlighting the cases in which the 
government used “social order” as a basis to sacrifice Taiwanese citizens’ privacy rights). 
88  See Huang, supra note 78. 
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passing the law. 89  In the additional resolution, the legislature 
asked the Ministry of Justice to define “public interest” in the 
Enforcement Rules of the PDPA after consulting experts and 
members from civil society. 90  But since then, the Ministry of 
Justice has not responded to the request. Consequently, the 
government and the courts usually determine that this public 
interest requirement has been satisfied if a program is carried out 
for public purposes in the public sector, as open data initiatives 
are.91 But the data users (in most cases, the government) and the 
courts have never carefully analyzed an open data regime to 
determine what the public interest at issue is, nor have they 
weighed the importance of a claimed public interest against an 
individual’s right to privacy.92 Under this current legal framework, 
those who employ public interest justifications usually prevail and 
individuals’ privacy interests are diminished even further.93  
While the Taiwanese is working to support the rapidly 
growing data initiatives in the country, the PDPA remains the only 
available mechanism to ensure privacy protections. A privacy 
protection mechanism with numerous undefined terms and 
loopholes as the only avenue for protecting individuals’ data 
privacy therefore continues to contribute to the privacy perils of 
Taiwan’s open data initiatives.  
III. CASE STUDIES 
The Electronic Toll Collect System, the Taiwan National 
Health Insurance Research Databases, and the COVID-19 
surveillance measures recently implemented in Taiwan provide 
three examples of the flaws in Taiwan’s open data initiatives. 
These case studies highlight the need to adequately address data 
 
89    See Liu Ching-Yi (劉靜怡), BuSuan JinBu de LiFa: “GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa” 
ChuBu PingXi (不算進步的立法: 『個人資料保護法』初步評析) [A Legislation that is 
Not Really Progressive: A Preliminary Comment on Personal Information Protection Law], 
153 TAIWAN L. REV. 147, 156–64 (2010). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. See also Liu Luo-yi (劉珞亦), Jianbao Zihliao Singjheng Susongan Gezih 
Baohu yu Jianbao Zihliao Jhihkua ji Guan Lioudong ji Ercihli yong (健保資料行政訴訟
案個資保護與健保資料之跨機關流動及二次利用) [The NHI Personal Data Case, the 
NHI Data Flow Between Different Agencies, and the Second Use], ANGLE (Jan. 9, 2020), 
http://www.angle.com.tw/ahlr/discovery/post.aspx?ipost=3221.  
92  See Liu, supra note 89, at 162. 
93  Id. 
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privacy concerns when examining open data policies. They also 
showcase the urgent need to address the current flaws in the PDPA 
– the lack of protection for sensitive data, the lack of a private 
right to consent and opt-out, and the ambiguity of the term “public 
interest.”  
A. Open Data and the Electronic Toll Collect System 
The Electronic Toll Collect system illustrates how a 
database established by a public-private partnership can be 
exploited by a private company, and moreover, how the 
government misused data in the name of the ambiguous “public 
interests” embedded within the PDPA.94  
In 2004, Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication commissioned the Far Eastern Electronic Toll 
Collection (Far Eastern), a private corporation, to build the 
Electronic Toll Collect system (ETC) on the country’s highways 
to replace traditional toll-collecting by workers in toll booths.95 
Under the build-operate-transfer contract (BOTC), a type of 
public-private-partnership contract, Far Eastern was granted the 
right to operate the ETC and the associated data system for twenty 
years before returning the right of operation back to the 
government.96 
Taiwan’s traditional toll booths were all successfully 
replaced by the ETC by 2013.97 The ETC collects and records 
information about vehicles driving on the highways, including 
time of day, location, distance traveled, and amount paid.98 For the 
ETC to gather tolls, many vehicles are equipped with e-Tags, 
 
94  Ho Ming-Syuan (何明諠), ShuWei ShiDai de YinSi BianJie: yi JianBao 
ZiLiaoKu yu ETC JiaoTong ZiLiaoKu WeiLi (數位時代的隱私邊界：以健保資料庫與 
ETC 交通資料庫為例) [The Rights to Privacy in the Digital Age: The Case of the Health 
Insurance Research Database and the ETC Traffic Database], 3 TAIWAN HUM. RTS. J. 1
39, 147–49 (2016). 
95  FAR EASTERN ELECTRONIC TOLL COLLECTION CO., LTD. (FETC), 
http://www.fetc.net.tw/en/OurBusiness/AboutFETC.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
96  Id. 
97  See Chang, supra note 55, at 146; see also, ShouFeiYuan ZhuanZhi LiCheng 
(收 費 員 轉 置 辦 理 歷 程) [The Process to Relocate Clerks 
in Toll Booths], FREEWAY BUREAU (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.freeway.gov.tw/Publi
sh.aspx?cnid=133. 
98  Chang, supra note 55, at 147. 
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gadgets that help the ETC identify cars and record data.99 As of 
January 2020, 87.94% of all registered vehicles in Taiwan were 
equipped with e-Tags.100 The ETC can also scan the license plates 
of vehicles that are not equipped with e-Tags,101 which enables the 
ETC to record information about all vehicles using the highways, 
whether they have e-Tags or not.102 
This system has created a comprehensive database of 
traffic data and has proved to be incredibly helpful for Taiwanese 
government agencies and the private sector.103 However, potential 
privacy violations may ensue alongside the beneficial uses of the 
data. For example, in 2013, Far Eastern unilaterally instituted a 
policy that charged third parties for the e-Tag data they obtained 
and used for their own purposes. 104  The policy was severely 
criticized by civil society, with many claiming that Far Eastern 
was profiting off of selling e-Tags users’ personal data.105 The 
policy was subsequently disapproved by the supervising 
government agency, the Freeway Bureau of the Ministry of 
 
99  EIT, eTag ETC Highway Electronic Toll System, ENGLISH IN TAIWAN (Sept. 
20, 2020), https://www.englishintaiwan.com/life-in-taiwan/e-tag-highway-electronic-toll-
system-information.  
100  In January 2020, Far Eastern claimed that 7,140,000 cars in Taiwan were 
equipped with e-Tags. The government record shows that the total number of automobiles 
in Taiwan was 8,119,056 in the same month. Thus, the percentage of the cars equipped with 
e-Tags was roughly 87.94%. See Jian-Jhih Guo (郭建志) GuoDao JiCheng ShouFei 
LiouJhouNian e-tag ShengJi uTagGO (國道計程收費六周年 e-tag升級 uTagGO) [After 
Six Years of Toll Charges, E-tag Was Upgraded to uTagGO], COM. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://ctee.com.tw/livenews/ctee/aj/a08616002020011511282804; The List of Numbers of 
Registered Automobiles, MINISTRY OF TRANSP. AND COMM., https://stat.motc.gov.tw/mo
cdb/stmain.jsp?sys=100&funid=a3301 (last visited Nov. 21, 2020). 
101  See Lu, supra note 67. 
102  Ho, supra note 94, at 147. 
103  For example, the National Taxation Bureau of Kaohsiung uses the data on the 
number of tolls paid by tour buses to audit the bus companies and determine if they have 
honestly filed their taxes. See YouLanCheYe ShenBaXiaoShouE BingWei Yin LuKe 
GuanGuang XiangDui ChengZhang GuoShueiJyu Jiang JiaChiang Duei YouLanChe 
YehJhe ChaHe (遊覽車業申報銷售額並未因陸客觀光相對成長 國稅局將加強對遊覽
車業者查核) [The Declared Sales of the Tour Bus Industry Did Not Grow Relatively with 
the Sightseeing of China Visitors; the Taxation Bureau Will Increase Tax Auditing], LAW 
BANK (Sept. 14, 2013), https://www.lawbank.com.tw/news/NewsContent.aspx?NID=113
954.  
104  See, e.g., Liwei, Ducyu e-tag Syuhao Kong Sie Gezih (立委︰讀取 e-tag序號
恐洩個資) [Legislator: Read e-Tag Serial Number for Fear of Leaking Personal 
Information], LIBERTY TIMES (May 2, 2013), https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/paper/675
481.  
105  Id. 
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Transportation and Communication (Freeway Bureau) and 
eventually retracted by Far Eastern.106 
One year later, the Criminal Investigation Bureau 
demanded that the Freeway Bureau and Far Eastern hand over all 
vehicle travel information, including license plate numbers, travel 
time logs, locations, video images, and vehicle data of individuals 
who were not criminal suspects.107 Far Eastern initially refused to 
turn over the data, turning to the Ministry of Justice for legal 
opinions. 108  However, Far Eastern later reached an agreement 
with the Criminal Investigation Bureau stating that the 
transportation data cannot be reviewed until the Criminal 
Investigation Bureau’s requests were approved by prosecutors.109 
Far Eastern later released its “Policy to PDPA Protection” that 
addresses its relationships and interactions with the government 
as “comply[ing] with the PDPA” 110 without clearly indicating 
whether any of the data has been or will be handed over to the 
Criminal Investigation Bureau.  
The government’s utilization of the data stored in the ETC 
e-Tag system did not stop at the agreement with Far Eastern. In 
2015, as the number of open data initiatives in Taiwan continued 
to grow, the Freeway Bureau decided to make all ETC data open 
to the public and available online.111 Under this system, anyone 
can simply visit the Freeway Bureau’s website and download both 
 
106  Id. Yoguan Meiti Baodao Guodao Dienji Shofei (ETC) Duchu eTag Shuhao 
Konshie Gezi Zi Shuomin (有關媒體報導國道電子收費(ETC) 讀取 eTag序號恐洩個資
之說明) [A Clarification on the News Reporting on the Possible Leak of Personal Data as 
A Result from ETC's Reading of eTag], FREEWAY BUREAU (May 7, 2013) https://www.fre
eway.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=193&p=4429. 
107  Liu Si-Yi (劉世怡), Diaoyue Singchejilu Reyi Singshihjyu Shuoming (調閱行
車紀錄惹議 刑事局說明) [Access to Driving History is Controversial, National Police 
Agency Explain], CENT. NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 11, 2014), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/fi
rstnews/201401110016.aspx; See also Lu, supra note 67. 
108  Lu, supra note 67. 
109  Id. 
110  Geren Ziliao Baohu Fangshi ji Zhengce Shengming (個人資料保護方式及政
策聲明) [The Policy and Approach to Protect Personal Data], FETC (Mar. 2, 2021) 
https://www.fetc.net.tw/UX/UX0901SharePoint/UX090101HtmlContent?processId=UX0
4030103. 
111  Wong Yong-Chyuan (翁嫆琄), JhengFu TiGong Etc ZihLiao JhaiBenChiao 
BaoJheng WaBuChu GeZih (政府提供 ETC 資料，翟本喬保證挖不出個資) [The 
Government Provides ETC Data, Jhai Ben-Chiao Promised that No One Can Dig Personal 
Information Out of the Data] (Oct. 5, 2015), NEWTALK, https://newtalk.tw/news/view/20
15-10-05/65305.  
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real-time and historical de-identified data on traffic, vehicles’ 
speed, travel routes, and other related information.112  
The Freeway Bureau’s choice to publicize the ETC’s data 
unsurprisingly elicited worries and criticisms from civil society.113 
First, critics expressed concerns that the disclosure of the data, 
though de-identified, would violate the PDPA if the government 
did not obtain consent from data subjects.114 According to the 
PDPA, if a government agency uses individuals’ personal data, the 
use shall be in accordance with the specific purpose of the data’s 
collection.115 The ETC was originally intended to collect highway 
tolls. However, data about the all vehicles, including travel time 
logs, locations, and images are also collected and stored in the 
ETC database.116 One could argue that the data can therefore only 
be used for toll-collecting, as this was the original specific purpose 
of the data collection, and other uses irrelevant to collecting tolls 
on the highway fall outside the scope of the original purpose.117  
To counter this argument, the Freeway Bureau contended 
that publicizing the ETC data aligns with public interests. 118 
Under the exception outlined in Article 16 of the PDPA, an agency 
may use data beyond the specific purpose of collection if 
necessary to further public interest. 119  The Freeway Bureau 
 
112  See id. See also Points to Note When Using Downloaded Materials, FREEWAY 
BUREAU TRAFFIC DATABASE, http://tisvcloud.freeway.gov.tw/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
113  Wo de SingChe JiLu Ni de KaiFang ZihLiao? Zuan GeZihFa LouDong JhengFu 
DaLiang KaiFang RenMin ZihLiao (我的行車紀錄，你的開放資料？ 鑽個資法漏洞，
政府大量開放人民資料！) [Is My Traffic Data Your Open Data? The Government Drills 
Legal Loopholes to Massively Open Civils' Data], TAIWAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.tahr.org.tw/news/1656 [hereinafter Wo de SingChe 
JiLu]. 
114  Id. 
115  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, art. 5. 
116  See Lu, supra note 67. 
117  See Lu Yi-Ron (呂苡榕), WoMen You BuBei Etag KueiKan De QuanLi Ma? 
(我們有不被 Etag窺看的權利嗎?) [Do We Have the Right to be Free From Surveillance 
Under Etag?], INITIUM MEDIA (June 14, 2016), https://theinitium.com/article/20160614-
taiwan-eTag2/.  
118  Ho, supra note 94, at 148. 
119  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. II, art. 16 (“[A] government agency shall use personal data only within the necessary 
scope of its statutory duties and for the specific purpose of collection; the use of personal 
data for another purpose shall be only on any of the following bases: . . . 2. where it is 
necessary for ensuring national security or furthering public interest; . . . 5. where it is 
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claimed that making the data publicly available online satisfies 
this public interest requirement.120 For example, by reading and 
downloading the data online, the public can develop a better 
understanding of traffic patterns and make more sophisticated 
public transportation plans.121 
Nevertheless, the Freeway Bureau’s proffered “public 
interest” purpose still leaves several issues open. For example, it 
will be difficult for the government and the data subjects to ensure 
that the data, which can be downloaded for free by anonymous 
users all over the world, is used for public good.122 Furthermore, 
if a company uses the data to develop a traffic monitoring 
application and sells the app for a profit, it seems unlikely that the 
company’s use of the data in this for-profit manner should be 
construed as a public interest matter.123 
Another legal conflict relating to the use of ETC data 
arose in 2017 and explicitly showcases the ambiguity of the term 
“public interest.”124 The Motor Vehicles Office of the Directorate 
General of Highways in HsinChu acquired vehicle images from 
the ETC database, identified them, and then issued traffic citations 
to vehicles driving on the shoulder of the road.125 One of the issues 
in this case was whether the Motor Vehicles Office could use the 
data without obtaining consent from the data subjects. The Taiwan 
HsinChu District Court ruled that the ETC image data could not 
be used as evidence of illegal driving because the Office’s use of 
data was unrelated to the original purpose of toll-collecting.126 The 
Court further pointed out that without the data subjects’ consent, 
 
necessary for statistics gathering or academic research by a government agency or an 
academic institution for public interests; provided that such data, as processed by the data 
provider or as disclosed by the data collector, may not lead to the identification of a specific 
data subject.”). 
120  ETC ZihLiao DueiWai KaiFang jhih ShuoMing (ETC資料對外開放之說明) 




121  Id. 
122  Ho, supra note 94, at 148. 
123  Id. 
124  HsinChu DiFang FaYuan (新竹地方法院) [HsinChu District Court], 105 Nian 
Su Jaio Zi No. 119 (新竹地方法院 105 年交字第 119 號判決) (2016) (Mar. 13, 2017) 
(Taiwan). 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
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the Office’s use of data would increase the subjects’ privacy 
risk.127 As a result, the public interest exception in this case did 
not prevail.128  
Another concern from critics is the effectiveness of de-
identifying e-Tag data. Article 16 of the PDPA allows certain 
exceptions when government agencies use data for other purposes 
than what it was originally collected for but requires the agencies 
to de-identify the data when making them available for secondary 
use.129 However, the PDPA fails to clearly indicate whether the 
agencies must obtain informed consent from data subjects if the 
uses of data will exceed the original purpose of the data 
collection. 130  In the traffic database that the Freeway Bureau 
opened to the public, the only data removed was license plate 
numbers. 131  The Freeway Bureau claimed that removing the 
license plate numbers effectively de-identified the data, and thus, 
there was no need to obtain consent.132 However, even without 
license plate numbers, user identification is still possible given the 
amount of data released.133 Information about vehicles’ departure 
locations, destinations, and travel times is released. 134  When 
traffic is light, one could theoretically identify the vehicles that 
use highways by compiling all of this accessible information.135 
Furthermore, a person could use the images of a vehicle, the time, 
and the location of the vehicle traveling on the highway to surveil 
the travel route of the driver.136 Unfortunately, as discussed, there 
are no requirements regarding the security level or necessary 
thresholds for data de-identification in the PDPA. Therefore, 
under this loose regulatory regime, the simple step of removing 
vehicles’ license plate numbers might be enough to satisfy the 
 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. II, art. 16 (“[A] government agency shall use personal data only within the necessary 
scope of its statutory duties and for the specific purpose of collection.”). 
130  See Is My Traffic Data Your Open Data? The Government Drills Legal 
Loopholes to Massively Open Civils' Data, supra note 113. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  See The List of Numbers of Registered Automobiles, supra note 100. 
134  See Is My Traffic Data Your Open Data? The Government Drills Legal 
Loopholes to Massively Open Civils' Data67, supra note 113. 
135  Id.  
136  Lu, supra note 67. 
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PDPA’s de-identification requirement for using the data without 
obtaining consent from data subjects. However, this potential 
conclusion could have severe negative ramifications in terms of 
privacy protection. Since there is no clear prohibition on data 
compiling under these circumstances, critics worry that the data 
could be combined with other information and used for 
surveillance.137 
The above examples highlight not only the imprudent and 
insufficient privacy practices of Far Eastern and the Freeway 
Bureau, but also underscore a greater issue in the PDPA overall – 
the PDPA’s ambiguities have left data subjects, specifically the 
drivers travelling on Taiwan’s highways, in privacy peril.  
B. Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Research Databases 
Since 1995, the Taiwanese government has mandated that 
all citizens with official residency and all foreign nationals living 
in Taiwan with an Alien Resident Certificate be covered under the 
National Health Insurance (NHI) program to receive affordable 
medical services.138 As of June 2019, a total of 23,894,289 people 
were participating in NHI, equating to 99.9% of the population.139 
The government agency in charge of the program is the 
National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA), a department 
within the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW). 140  To 
successfully administer national health insurances affairs, the 
NHIA must collect, process, and maintain both insured patients’ 
 
137  Lin Nan-Sen (林楠森), Taiwan LaiHong: DianZih ShouFei de GaoSuGongLu 
(台灣來鴻：電子收費的高速公路) [A Letter from Taiwan: The Highway with a Toll-
Collecting System], BBC (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/taiwan_let
ters/2014/01/140130_tw_letters_motorwayfee. 
138  See NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, 2020-2021 HANDBOOK 
OF TAIWAN'S NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (Ministry of Health & Welfare 2019), 
https://ws.nhi.gov.tw/001/Upload/293/RelFile/Ebook/English.pdf (last visited May 27, 
2021). 
139  NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE 2019-2020 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (Ministry of Health & Welfare 2020), 
https://www.nhi.gov.tw/Nhi_E-
LibraryPubWeb/Periodical/P_Detail.aspx?CP_ID=221&CPT_TypeID=8. 
140  NHIA Organization, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 27, 
2016), https://www.nhi.gov.tw/english/Content_List.aspx?n=EF2C14B2B87D7E2E&top
n=ED4A30E51A609E49. 
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and service providers’ information.141 The information collected 
by the NHIA includes the personal data of patients, costs of the 
medical treatment received, and appointment schedules.142 
Since the NHI program is mandatory and almost all 
Taiwanese citizens are covered, a vast amount of potentially 
valuable personal data has been collected. In 1998, the NHIA 
transferred the data from the insurance program to the National 
Health Research Institute (NHRI), a non-profit foundation for 
medical research funded primarily by the government. 143  The 
NHRI proceeded to establish the National Health Insurance 
Research Database (the Database) to maintain all “registration 
files and original claims for reimbursement” that were transferred 
from the NHI program.144 The Database also made these files and 
claims available to academics who wished to use the data for 
research.145 
Nevertheless, the NHIA was questioned for failing to 
properly de-identifying their medical data.146 The NHRI defended 
itself and claimed that the personal identification numbers were 
encrypted and patient birth dates were deleted (although the birth 
year and month were retained) before the NHIA transferred the 
data into the Database.147 The NHRI also de-identified the data 
again before making it available for research purposes.148 Further, 
the NHRI argued that to use the data from the Database for 
 
141  See JianKang yu YiLiao ZihLiao de JiaJhih YingYong (Er): Cyuanmin Jiankang 
Baosian Zihliaoku Jianjie (健康與醫療資料的加值應用(二): 全民健康保險資料庫簡介) 
[Health and Medical Data Value-Added Application 2: Introduction to the National Health 
Insurance Database], PANSCI (July 8, 2012), https://pansci.asia/archives/18437. 
142  Id. 
143  Overview, NATIONAL HEALTH RESEARCH INSTITUTE (NHRI), 
https://www.nhri.edu.tw/eng/About/more?id=757957da67f54478bb0030e32d0bc70d (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2020). 
144  Background, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESEARCH DATABASE, 
http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2020). See also Yu-Chun Chen 
et al., Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Research Database: Administrative Health Care 
Database as Study Object in Bibliometrics, 86 SCIENTOMETRICS 367, 365–80 (2011). 
145  Id. 
146  See, e.g., Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu 
Su Zi No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北高
等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan); Tsai et al. v. National 
Health Insurance Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) 
(ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) 
(Taiwan). 
147  Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 8–11. 
148  Id. 
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research purposes, an individual must fill out an application form 
and submit their plan to an institutional review board (IRB) for 
approval.149 The NHRI then consults experts to decide whether to 
grant permission to applicants.150  
In 2011, in addition to the Database, the MHW established 
what became the Health and Welfare Data Science Center (Data 
Center) to consolidate all valuable health information from the 
NHI Program and make it available to both academic researchers 
and government agencies.151 The goal of this data consolidation 
was to facilitate governmental policy-making, promote medical 
research, and encourage innovation. 152  Since 2016, the Data 
Center has taken over the Database and became the sole resource 
for NHI Program information. 153  Currently, the Data Center 
Database is operated and maintained by the MHW. 154  To de-
identify the data, the MHW staff will encrypt the data in their own 
site before turning it over to the Data Center.155 The Data Center 
also requires that researchers who want to access the data for 
research purposes personally visit the Data Center and conduct all 
data analysis while physically in the center.156 The Data Center 
uses this process to reduce the risks of a data leak or any abuse of 
the data. 157  The process of accessing data in the Data Center 
Database is the same as the process of applying for data within the 
 
149  Id. 
150  Application Process, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE RESEARCH DATABASE, 
https://nhird.nhri.org.tw/apply_01.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
151  About HWDC, HEALTH AND WELFARE DATA SCIENCE CENTER, 
https://hdsr.ym.edu.tw/files/11-1274-1530.php?Lang=zh-tw (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
152  Id. 
153  See Ho, supra note 94, at 143; see also Latest News, NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE RESEARCH DATABASE, http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/news (last visited Mar. 11, 
2020). The announcement on the webpage states that the database service has been 
terminated as of June 2015. All original data in the database was returned to the NHIA. 
154  See National Health Insurance Research Database, 
http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/news (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
155  See Review Instructions for the Application of the Health and Welfare Data, 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ePVpZ_XsCcN3
wucWqKaJHcobb3AYMMxW/view (last visited June 15, 2020). 
156  See HWDC Q & A, HEALTH AND WELFARE DATA SCIENCE CENTER (2017), 
https://dep.mohw.gov.tw/DOS/np-2497-113.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
157  See generally Lee Lili (李麗莉), JianBao ZihLiaoKu zai DaShuJyu ShihDai 
MianLin GeZih BaoHu WunTi jhih TanTaor (健保資料庫在大數據時代面臨個資保護問
題之探討) [Exploring Personal Information Protection Issues in the Health Insurance 
Database in the Age of Big Data], LEGISLATIVE YUAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=6590&pid=179126. 
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Database: a researcher must submit forms and plans, and these 
must be approved by an IRB and reviewed by experts.158  
The NHIA does not request consent from its data subjects 
either before, during, or after the processing this vast array of 
personal health information.159 This is significant because, in this 
situation, the data subjects are the individuals insured under the 
program – 99.9% of the Taiwanese population. 160  These data 
subjects also have no opportunity to request for data controllers or 
processors to stop using or processing their information.161 This 
means that 99.9% of the population in Taiwan has no right to any 
form of opt-out mechanism regarding their potentially personal 
medical data.  
In 2012, eight individuals from several civil rights 
organizations, including the Taiwan Association of Human Rights, 
filed a lawsuit against the NHIA and claimed that the NHIA’s 
transfer of the data within the Data Center Database out to third 
parties did not align with public interests.162 They also argued that 
the data was not properly de-identified.163 
According to the PDPA, medical records are categorized 
as sensitive information and thus should not be collected, 
processed, or used by the government or non-government 
entities.164 However, sensitive information may be used by these 
parties when it is necessary to do statistical or academic research 
for the purpose of public interests, such as for “healthcare, public 
 
158  See The Review Instructions for the Application of the Health and Welfare Data, 
supra note 155. 
159  See Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu Su Zi 
No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) at 3, 6 (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北
高等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan). 
160  See QuanMinJianKangBaoSian BaoSian DueiSiang RenShu An LeiBieh 
SingBieh NianLingTseng TongJi (全民健康保險保險對象人數按類別性別年齡層統計) 
[Gender and Age Statistics of the National Health Insurance], MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, https://data.nhi.gov.tw/Datasets/DatasetDetail.aspx?id=288&Mid=LILIANYA
NG (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
161  See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 3, 6. 
162  Id. 
163  See Chang Chen-Hung, Controversy over Information Privacy Arising from 
Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Database, 40 CHUNG YUAN CHRISTIAN UNIV. L. 
REV. 185, 187 (2018). 
164  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, art. 6.  
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health, or crime prevention.”165 However, a government agency 
that intends to use this information for the public interest and in a 
way beyond the scope of the original collection purpose shall also 
have the data de-identified.166 
In Tsai et al. v. NHIA, the plaintiffs first argued that, 
because the NHIA did not obtain consent from the data subjects, 
their process and use of the data should be limited to the scope of 
the agency’s statutory duties under Article 6 of the PDPA. 167 
Furthermore, they argued that because there was no public interest 
involved in the agency’s publication of the data to the public, the 
disclosure of the data to third parties violated the data subjects’ 
privacy.168 In response, the NHIA argued that there was a relevant 
public interest because the data had been helpful to research and 
resulted in academic periodical publications. 169  The plaintiffs 
subsequently responded to this counterargument by claiming that 
the NHIA could not prove a direct link between the public interest 
and the research or academic publications.170  
The plaintiffs also argued that the NHIA gave the third 
parties improperly encrypted data.171 Without proper encryption, 
individuals could be re-identified by combining the data stored in 
the Databases with data stored elsewhere.172 The plaintiffs argued 
that this was a direct violation of the PDPA.173 In response, the 
NHIA maintained that the data had been through multiple layers 
of encryption, which should be effective enough to ensure the 
data’s security and prevent the re-identification of data subjects.174 
 
165  Id. ch. I, art. 6. Additionally, Article 15 of the PDPA mandates that a government 
agency that is going to collect or process personal data must provide a specific purpose for 
the collection or processing and comply with one of the following conditions: “1. where it 
is within the necessary scope to perform its statutory duties; 2. where consent has been 
given by the data subject; or 3. where the rights and interests of the data subject will not be 
infringed upon.” 
166  Id. ch. II, art. 16. 
167  See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 3, 6. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. at 5, 37. 
172  Id. 
173  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, art. 16. 
174  See id. ch. I, art. 16; see also Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance 
Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) at 6 (ZuiGao 
XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) (Taiwan). 
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The plaintiffs also raised the issue of the right to opt-out 
from subsequent data uses, citing precedent from the 
Constitutional Court of Taiwan.175 In the precedent, Interpretation 
603, the Court elaborated that people should be equipped with the 
right to control their own personal data because they must be able 
to decide whether or not to disclose it, and, if so, “to what extent, 
at what time, in what manner and to whom” such information will 
be disclosed.176 Further, individuals also have the right “to correct 
any inaccurate entries contained in their information.” 177  In a 
separate opinion, the Court also stated that the freedom from 
unwanted intrusion into one’s private life and individual’s 
autonomy over one’s own personal data are recognized as 
constitutional rights.178 However, the Court pointed out that the 
right to control personal data is not absolute and could be 
burdened with certain restrictions by the State.179  
Citing the Constitutional Court of Taiwan, the Tsai et al. 
plaintiffs argued that the “right to control personal data” includes 
not only the right to consent to how one’s personal data will be 
processed and used, but also the right to an opt-out mechanism – 
the right to request their personal data not be used or processed.180 
The PDPA even explicitly stipulates that individuals cannot waive 
their right to “demand the cessation of the collection, processing 
or use of his/her personal data.”181 This implies that there is a right 
to opt-out. The plaintiffs contended that if they were not given the 
opportunity to consent, then they are at least entitled to the right 
to request that the use of their data cease.182 
The plaintiffs lost their case in the Taipei High 
Administrative Court (High Court), and subsequently appealed to 
 
175  See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014). 
176  Interpretation No. 603, 2005 47 JUDICIAL YUAN GAZETTE 1, 1 (Sifayuan 
Dafaguan Huiyi Sept. 28 2005). 
177  Id.  
178  See Interpretation No. 689, 2011 53 JUDICIAL YUAN GAZETTE 11, 11 (Sifayuan 
Dafaguan Huiyi July 29, 2011), translation available at http://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/en-
us/jep03/show?expno=689 (last visited May 27, 2021). 
179  Id.  
180  See generally Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014). 
181  GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection Act] 
ch. I, art. 3. 
182  Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 4. 
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the Supreme Administrative Court (Supreme Court).183 In 2016, 
the Supreme Court also ruled against the plaintiffs, finding in 
favor of the NHIA.184 
In response to the plaintiffs’ first argument that the NHIA 
was unable to prove that there was a direct public interest related 
to the use and disclosure of their personal data, both the High 
Court and the Supreme Court found that both Databases were 
established to add value to the plaintiffs’ raw data by assisting with 
public health matters and academic research.185 They also held 
that the results from the Databases could further enhance the 
overall welfare for all citizens, thus finding a public interest 
justification in the use and disclosure of the personal data by the 
NHIA.186 
In making their determinations, both courts employed 
balancing tests. The High Court emphasized that the PDPA’s 
purpose is to “protect” rather than maintain “the secrecy” of 
personal data.187 In other words, there are many ways to “protect” 
the data, and this may include maintaining its secrecy, but they are 
not one in the same. Therefore, when an individual’s privacy right 
conflicts with the public interest, an individual’s right to control 
their own data should “stand back” for the public interest.188 The 
High Court also found that the databases contributed to medical 
studies that were beneficial to all citizens, and this was more 
important than the protection of individual privacy.189 In addition, 
the High Court determined that the NHIA had properly de-
identified the data and thus had used the data the manner least 
 
183  See generally Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 106 
NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) (ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高
行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) (Taiwan). 
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186  See Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014) at 14 (“The goal of establishing HWDC 
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harmful to an individual’s privacy.190 The High Court ultimately 
held that the NHIA’s disclosure of the data was indeed necessary 
and proper.191  
The Supreme Court also balanced the public’s interests 
against an individual’s privacy right. 192  The Supreme Court 
recognized that data is a valuable social resource, and a 
comprehensive database is an important and useful public good.193 
The Supreme Court pointed out that the government’s data 
collection resembles “sampling” in conducting a study. The 
Supreme Court elaborated, emphasizing that “in the process of 
sampling, one needs to be sure the samples could precisely be 
representative of the original population…if we allow there are 
[sic] any options for the samples, the quality of the samples would 
be severely impacted.”194 Thus, the Supreme Court found that it 
would be unreasonable to allow the plaintiffs to opt out of the 
databases simply to protect the individuals’ right to privacy.195 In 
its decision, the Supreme Court expressed concern that other 
individuals may follow the plaintiffs’ lead if individuals are 
granted the right to opt-out, and this result could squander the 
efforts and the expenses that the NHIA had spent on gathering the 
data and building the databases.196  
The Tsai et al. v. NHIA case has revealed several alarming 
perils of open data in Taiwan. First, it is apparent that a detailed 
and thoughtful privacy protection program is absent from 
Taiwan’s implementation of its open data initiatives. In Tsai et al., 
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191  Id. 
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194  Id. at 37. 
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result in the unnecessary waste of the cost of data gathering.”) (Translated).  
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the NHIA lacked a sophisticated de-identification and monitoring 
process while simultaneously being responsible for collecting and 
handling almost every Taiwanese resident’s health information. 
By relying solely on a questionable de-identification process, the 
NHIA ignored all other viable options for protecting their data 
subjects’ privacy.  
The next question raised by Tsai et al. concerns the extent 
of de-identification and how much must be done to achieve the 
protection of personal data.197 Although the PDPA requires that 
data subjects must not be able to be identified after information is 
processed or disclosed, the law itself remains ambiguous about 
what exactly “de-identification” means and to what extent de-
identification is necessary.198 The PDPA leaves it open, relying 
instead upon the discretion of government agencies and decisions 
made by courts.199 As a result, the strength of privacy protections 
for Taiwanese citizens is uncertain and hinges on the internal 
procedures of government agencies and judges’ understanding and 
recognition of privacy.  
In Tsai et al. v. NHIA, the Supreme Court chose to blame 
data predators for possible privacy violations.200  However, the 
peril that results from the combination of dispersed databases is 
exactly where privacy advocates should focus their concern. 201 In 
contrast to this opinion from the Supreme Court, the international 
community and international organizations, such as the 
 
197  Many prominent legal scholars have long recognized that anonymization and 
de-identification would not be an ultimate guarantee of privacy protection. See, e.g., 
Kathleen Benitez & Bradley Malin, Evaluating Re-identification Risks with Respect to the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule, 37 J. LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 169, 170 (2010); Paul Ohm, Broken 
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701, 1719-20 (2010); Jules Polonetsky, Omer Tene & Kelsey Finch, Shades of Gray: 
Seeing the Full Spectrum of Practical Data De-Identification, 56 SAN CLARA L. 
REV. 593, 602 (2016); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII +9Problem: Privacy 
and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841 
(2011). 
198  See GenRen ZiLiao BaoHuFa (個人資料保護法) [Personal Data Protection 
Act] ch. I, arts. 6, 9; ch. II, art. 16; ch. III, arts. 19, 20. 
199  Id. 
200  Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No. 
54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) at 36 (ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院) 
[Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) (Taiwan). 
201 See Briefing Paper on Data and Privacy, CARNEGIE UNITED KINGDOM TRUST, 
(June 2017), https://www.involve.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/Better-Use-of-Data-
background-briefing.pdf. 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, have 
recognized that governments must be responsible for enhancing 
database safeguards and protections.202 Governments worldwide 
have opted for intensified privacy protection to provide a safer and 
more trustworthy data environment that can further encourage the 
development of data usage. 203  Nonetheless, in Tsai et al., the 
Supreme Court strayed from this international regulatory trend 
and therefore missed the opportunity to urge Taiwan’s government 
toward a stronger privacy protection regime, particularly for the 
protection of sensitive medical data.  
The Taiwanese government has wrongly equated “public 
purpose” with “public interest.” Even worse, the decisions 
analyzed above further depicts that courts, without any adequate 
deliberation on the constitutional meaning of data privacy, rushed 
to endorse the government’s mistaken view of the definition of 
“public interest” in the PDPA. However, in reality, the PDPA does 
not address the standards that should be used to determine “public 
interest.” Neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court provided 
sophisticated reasoning in answering these questions about 
whether and how reasonable and feasible criteria should be 
established in PDPA.204  Rather, the courts mistakenly equated 
public purpose with “public interest” – if the defendant claimed 
the measures were adopted for a public purpose, whether for 
medical research or innovation, the courts assumed that there was 
a potential public interest.205 This same “public interest” rationale 
also led the Supreme Court to deny the opt-out right and require 
that the plaintiffs’ health data remain indefinitely in the Database 
regardless of the plaintiffs’ opposing desires. 
 
202  See Health Data Governance: Privacy, Monitoring and Research (Policy Brief 
version), OECD (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.oecd.org/publications/health-data-
governance-9789264244566-en.htm. 
203  Id. 
204  See Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu Su Zi 
No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) at 18 (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北高
等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan) (The High Court pointed 
out that the NHIA’s giving data to third parties was “…for academic research. The transfer 
of the data was for academic purposes, which was obviously in the public interest.”); Tsai 
(Sup. Admin. Ct. 2017) at 36. (The Supreme Court did not specify what “public interest” 
is. Instead, the Supreme Court proceeded to state that “the establishment of a large database 
was very important for quantitative research.”). 
205  See Tsai (Sup. Admin. Ct. 2017), at 36, 37; Tsai (Taipei Admin. High Ct. 2014), 
at 16. 
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C. Data Sharing and Surveillance Practices in Response to 
COVID-19 
During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
fear of the virus prompted sentiment of unity within the Taiwanese 
community.206  Spurred by people’s need for public safety, the 
Taiwanese government adopted stringent surveillance 
measures. 207  The data sharing and surveillance practices 
implemented to combat COVID-19 have demonstrated how the 
democratic government’s actions, while supported by citizens’ 
wishes for effective control over the pandemic, might impact civil 
rights and liberties. Taiwan’s story may even imply the possibility 
that citizens are willing to sacrifice privacy in exchange for public 
safety in emergency situations. However, it triggers another 
critical concern: would this anomalous violation of privacy 
intended to be temporary become “normalized” as a long-standing 
practice?208  
In early 2020, COVID-19 plunged the world into a global 
pandemic.209 Governments around the world declared states of 
emergency210 and adopted technological measures to deal with the 
outbreak. 211  These measures included data surveillance on 
 
206  See Huang Tzu-Ti, Rumors of Pneumonia Cases Reignite SARS Fears in China, 
TAIWAN NEWS (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3847781; see 
also, Keoni Everington, Taiwan's CDC Issues Warning for Plague in China, TAIWAN NEWS 
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3819546. 
207  See Pandemic Prevention | What Does Taiwan Prepare for COVID-19, TAIWAN 
EXTERNAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, https://www.anticovid19tw.org/295-2/ (last 
visited May 28, 2021). 
208  See, e.g., Darius Tahir, Surveillance Helped These Countries Fight Covid. A 
New Realm of Risks Await, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.politico.com/newslette
rs/future-pulse/2021/04/21/surveillance-helped-these-countries-fight-covid-a-new-realm-
of-risks-await-794790. 
209  Archived: WHO Timeline — COVID-19, WHO (Apr. 27, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19 (last visited Nov. 23, 
2020). 
210  See, e.g., Justin McCurry, Japan Declares State of Emergency over Coronavirus, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/07/japan-shinzo-
abe-declares-state-of-emergency-over-coronavirus; Rosie Perper et al., Almost All US 
States Have Declared States of Emergency to Fight Coronavirus — Here's What It Means 
for Them, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/california
-washington-state-of-emergency-coronavirus-what-it-means-2020-3. 
211  See, e.g., Creating the Coronopticon: Countries Are Using Apps and Data 
Networks to Keep Tabs on the Pandemic, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.econ
omist. com/briefing/2020/03/26/countries-are-using- apps-and-data-networks-to-keep-
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individuals’ travel history via data sharing within multiple 
databases maintained by government agencies,212 via requesting 
communications data from private sector actors such as internet 
and telecommunications companies,213 and via contact tracing, 
personal location, and health condition tracking through mobile 
software applications (apps). 214  Taiwan’s government was no 
different, as it also employed data sharing and surveillance 
measures in response to COVID-19.215 Each response implicates 
Taiwanese fundamental rights to privacy and other constitutional 
liberties. In this section, we first discuss the approaches to data 
sharing and surveillance that the Taiwanese government employed 
in its response to COVID-19. Next, we present a constitutional 
and legal analysis of the regulatory measures adopted by Taiwan 
and how these measures might compromise the protection of 
citizens’ fundamental rights in the name of saving lives from 
COVID-19. 
In response to the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, 
China, at the end of 2019, the Taiwan NHIA linked their medical 
Database with the “immigration database” maintained by the 
National Immigration Agency to track whether an individual had 
traveled into Taiwan from Wuhan.216 This combined database was 
 
tabs-on-the-pandemic; see also, Darius Tahir, Surveillance Helped These Countries Fight 
Covid. A New Realm of Risks Await, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.politico.com/
newsletters/future-pulse/2021/04/21/surveillance-helped-these-countries-fight-covid-a-
new-realm-of-risks-await-794790. 
212  See, e.g., Coronavirus: Under Surveillance and Confined at Home in Taiwan, 
BBC (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52017993. 
213 See, e.g., Huang Ya-Sheng, Sun Mei-Cen & Sui Yu-Ze, How Digital Contact 
Tracing Slowed Covid-19 in East Asia, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowed-covid-19-in-east-asia; see also 
Jon Fingas, Israel Stops Using Phone Tracking to Enforce COVID-19 Quarantines: 
Overseers Believe the Harm to Privacy Outweighs the Benefits, ENGADGET (April 22, 
2020), https://www.engadget.com/israel-halts-phone-tracking-for-covid-19-quarantine-
184622314.html. 
214  See Factbox: The Race to Deploy COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, REUTERS 
(May 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-apps-factbox-
idUSKBN22Q2KU. 
215   See Shu-Wan Jian et al., Contact Tracing with Digital Assistance in Taiwan’s 
COVID-19 Outbreak Response, 1 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 348, 349–50 (Oct. 2020). 
216  See Wu Bo-Xuan (吳柏軒), JjianBaoShu 1 Tian GengSin YunDuanSTtong 1640 
WuHan RuJingJhe WuSuoDun (健保署 1 天更新雲端系統 1640 武漢入境者無所遁) 
[National Health Insurance Administration Updates Cloud System in 1 Day, 1640 Wuhan 
Immigrants Have Nowhere to Go], LIBERTY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://news.ltn.com.t
w/news/life/breakingnews/3050362. 
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eventually linked to include the travel history of citizens coming 
into Taiwan from Japan, Korea, and other nearby countries if the 
nation reported growing COVID-19 outbreaks.217  The primary 
purpose of linking these databases was to allow physicians to 
automatically check for a patient’s travel history and determine if 
there was any risk of COVID-19 exposure.218 However, this vast 
access to information led to some extreme and absurd results when 
individuals with recent travel histories sought medical services. 
For instance, a woman with a tooth ache was rejected by 10 
dentists because of a recent visit to Hokkaido, Japan.219  
Although from the outbreak in late 2019 to April 2021, 
Taiwan has fortunately managed to keep the COVID-19 outbreak 
largely under control within the country,220 the following case 
ironically illustrates the inadequacies of the travel history 
surveillance system. The first wave of confirmed cases in Taiwan 
came after a Taiwanese navy ship with dozens of sailors returned 
from a visit to Palau in early April.221 Legislator Chen Jiau-hua 
(陳椒華) revealed that some of the sailors with confirmed cases 
of COVID-19 visited health clinics after disembarking in 
 
217 See Chang Ming-Xuan (張茗喧), 147 Wan ZengDao Rih Han MinJhong JiCi 
Cha JianBaoKa MiaoCha LyuYouShih (147萬曾到日韓民眾 即起插健保卡秒查旅遊史) 
[1.47 Million Individuals Who Had Traveled to Japan and/or South Korea Who Have 
Visited Japan and South Korea, Can Be Checked With Their Health Insurance Card], 
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/2020
02215012.aspx. 
218  See, e.g., Helier Cheung, Coronavirus: What Could the West Learn from Asia?, 
BBC (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51970379. 
219  See generally Keoni Everington, Taiwanese Woman Rejected by 10 Dentists 
After Returning from Hokkaido, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.taiwannews
.com.tw/en/news/3878893. 
220  Since the outbreak of COVID-19 until April 2021, the total number of cases in 
Taiwan was 1,057, with 11 deaths and 1022 recovered (data on April 12, 2021). However, 
ever since May 2021, Taiwan was caught short by the outbreak of the UK variant, the 
COVID-19 cases increased in a sudden. According to the Taiwan Centers for Disease 
Control, the total number of cases in Taiwan is 7,806, with 99 deaths and 1,133 recovered 
(this is current as of May 29, 2021). See COVID-19 Cases Report, TAIWAN CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL, https://sites.google.com/cdc.gov.tw/2019-ncov/taiwan (last visited 
May 29, 2021). 
221  See Ben Blanchard, Taiwan to Quarantine 700 Navy Sailors After Virus 
Outbreak, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-taiwan-idUSKBN2200BQ. 
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Taiwan,222 but the clinics were not alerted to their travel history 
when they checked their health insurance records.223 Furthermore, 
since May 2021, Taiwan was caught short by the outbreak of the 
B.1.1.7 variant, and the COVID-19 cases increased in a 
sudden.224Professor Chunhuei Chi, the director of Oregon State 
University’s center for global health, described Taiwan as “a 
victim of its own success”.225 He further explained that although 
Taiwan had locally eliminated the virus in early 2020, it neither 
prioritized the procurement of vaccines nor stayed up to date with 
the new COVID-19 variant’s increased transmissibility and high 
asymptomatic rate .226To deal with the sudden rapid growth of the 
COVID-19 cases, the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) 
has adopted data sharing and surveillance approaches like 
collaborating with the telecommunication service providers to 
single out certain citizens as “high-risk group” in the health 
insurance card.227 Yet, this policy confused local hospitals and 
raised questions like “should we refuse the patients from the high-
risk group?” or “where can those patients in the high-risk group to 
be transferred?” were emerged.228 In other words, the data sharing 
and data surveillance practices adopted by the Taiwanese 
government without clear legal authority may not be as effective 
as claimed. The positive aspects of mitigating and containing the 
COVID-19 pandemic by linking a patient’s travel history to their 
 
222  See Guo Jian-Shen (郭建伸), LiWei Jhih DunMuJian GuanBing JianBaoKa Wu 
ChuGuoShih TiSing JyunFang JhuYi (立委指敦睦艦官兵健保卡無出國史 提醒軍方注
意) [Legislator Pointed Out That Goodwill Fleet Officers and Soldiers Have No History of 
Going Abroad, Reminding the Military to Pay Attention], CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, (Apr. 
20, 2020), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202004200222. 
223  Id. 
224  See Helen Davidson, Taiwan Raises Covid Alert Level Nationwide as Infections 
Increase, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/ma
y/19/taiwan-raises-covid-alert-level-amid-rise-in-infections. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
227  See Xie Xing-En (謝幸恩) & Hong Ling-ling (洪玲玲), NeiBu WenJian 
PuGuang! ZhiHui ZhongXin Jing MiLing JianCe WanHua 60 WanRen ZuJi TiaoChu 
GaoFengXian XuQun ZhuJi JianBaoKa (內部文件曝光！指揮中心竟密令監測萬華 60
萬人足跡 挑出「高風險族群」註記健保卡) [Internal Document Exposed! CECC 
Secretly Commanded Monitor the Footprints of 600,000 People in WanHua Single Out the 
"High-Risk Groups" and Mark Up in the Health Insurance Card], YI MEDIA (毅傳媒) 
(May 26, 2021), https://yimedia.com.tw/covid19/117647/?fbclid=IwAR0Luo2D0kcZzA4
Dg-g-6o7WRF5AVGHucSCjMLwfjfabp5YUWa4BzhRueDs. 
228  Id. 
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health insurance card, are greatly diminished if some patients’ 
need for medical services are rejected without justification and 
individuals’ privacy rights are traded in exchange for inconsistent 
travel history alerts. Here, we present several approaches to data 
sharing and surveillance that the Taiwanese government employed 
in its response to COVID-19: the “M-Police,” the “Intellectual 
Surveillance Electronic Fence System,” and the “Taiwan Social 
Distancing App.” 
1. The “M-Police.” — In 2007, the National Police 
Agency (NPA) of the Ministry of Interior began to build a police 
cloud computing device called the “Police Mobile ” (known as the 
“M-Police” infrastructure) to promote and increase law 
enforcement effectiveness. 229  From 2012 to 2016, the basic 
platform of the Police Cloud Computing and the Police Mobile 
Computer System was established.230 Information in 31 databases 
from six government agencies concerning people, vehicles, 
criminal cases, objects, time, places, photos, and videos was 
integrated into the platform to enhance the efficiency of criminal 
investigations. 231  The “M-Police” also use commercial 
smartphones to easily customize to police equipment that decrease 
the heavy weight.232 Essentially, the “M-Police” is the deployment 
of big data policing platforms that aggregates and analyzes 
massive amounts of personal information. However, although 
helpful, this expansive amount of combined data can lead to 
discrimination and privacy invasions, which occurred in Taiwan 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In late February 2020, a young Indonesian woman who 
worked in several northern Taiwanese hospitals was Taiwan's 
 
229  See generally Police Cloud – M-Police Mobile Computer System, SCSE, 
https://en.smartcity.org.tw/index.php/en-us/component/k2/item/47-police-cloud-m-
police-mobile-computer-system (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). 
230  Id. 
231  Id. According to one of the contractors who helped the NPA establish the 
infrastructure, the Cloud Computing System provides 17 police applications, which include 
M-Police Integrated Query System, Real Time Audio and Video Transmission System, 
Instant Photo Comparison System, Instant License Plate Recognition System, Citizen 
Interview System, Police Instant Message System, Police Regulations Query, Police 
Common Operational Procedures Inquiry, etc. In addition to these powerful tracking 
applications, the Cloud Computing System also integrates the Cloud Police Mission 
Dispatch System, the Suspicious Vehicle Track Inquiry System, and the Police Service App. 
The system has significantly improved the efficiency of police in tracking individuals. 
232  Id. 
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32nd confirmed COVID-19 case. 233  The woman was an 
undocumented migrant.234 She was hired to work as a caregiver 
for an elderly man who was hospitalized and diagnosed as 
Taiwan's 27th COVID-19 case from February 11 to February 
16.235 The NPA helped the Center for Disease Control (CDC) track 
down this undocumented caregiver through the M-Police, and the 
CDC subsequently placed the woman in a negative-pressure 
isolated ward for quarantine and testing.236 When explaining the 
details of this confirmed case to the press, government authorities 
publicized the woman’s past locations and movements.237  The 
authorities also revealed many closed-circuit images retrieved 
from the Police Cloud Computing System to show that she had 
visited numerous sites in greater Taipei by traveling on buses, the 
Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation Metro Service, the Taipei Mass 
Rapid Transit, and Taiwan Railways Administration trains. 238 
Every detail that the M-Police had accumulated and retrieved 
about this woman was then widely reported in the newspaper, on 
TV news stations, and throughout the internet.239 It is apparent that 
even without any emergency use or exception clauses that may 
have relaxed data privacy regulations, many private details about 
the life of this young Indonesian woman were unnecessarily 
collected and revealed without adequate considerations or her 
consent.  
2. The “intellectual surveillance electronic fence 
 
233  Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, Taiwan Confirms Foreign 
Caregiver of Case #27 as 32nd Case of COVID-19, CDC (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/QMZlqDJORsFvH6k9GJHB2Q?typeid=158. 
234  See Nick Aspinwall, Calls for Amnesty as Undocumented Worker in Taiwan 
Contracts the Coronavirus, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 29, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/
calls-for-amnesty-as-undocumented-worker-in-taiwan-contracts-the-coronavirus/. 
235  See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, supra note 233. 
236  See Roy Ngerng, Taiwan's Digital Response to Covid-19: Impressive, But Is 
Privacy Respected?, NEWS LENS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://international.thenewslens.com/a
rticle/133095. 
237  Id. 
238  See Keoni Everington, Indonesian Infected with Coronavirus Traveled 
Extensively on Taipei MRT, TRA, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.taiwannew
s.com.tw/en/news/3882260. 
239  See Chen Wei-ting & Matthew Mazzetta, Migrant Caregiver Confirmed as 
Taiwan's 32nd COVID-
19 Case, FOCUS TAIWAN (Feb. 26, 2020), https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202002260013; 
see also Friend of 32nd Coronavirus Case Quarantined in Kaohsiung After Showing 
Symptoms, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/388
2660. 
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system.” — As part of the governmental effort to contain the 
spread of COVID-19, 240  the National Communication 
Commission (NCC), the most important regulator of 
telecommunication companies in Taiwan, demanded that five 
major telecommunication service providers in Taiwan deploy an 
“Intellectual Surveillance Electronic Fence System” (Surveillance 
System) to individuals’ cell phones241 to trace their movements in 
quarantine.242 The NCC supervises the Surveillance System and 
monitors whether individuals stay in their quarantine location243 
by reviewing locations detected on their phones. 244  The 
Surveillance System, deployed onto individuals’ cell phones, is 
connected to the M-Police.245 Whenever any individual has left 
 
240  See Chen Wei-Ting et al., CECC Issues Alert About Movements of 24 Infected 
Military Personnel, FOCUS TAIWAN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://focustaiwan.tw/society/2020
04200008. 
241  The phone could be self-owned phone or temporarily provided by the 
government during the quarantine period. See NCC Chenqiing: Taiwan “Dianzih Fangyi 
Fuwu Pingtai” Wei Guoren Zihjhu Kaifa Weiyu Waiguo Hezuo Cieci Yunyong Fuhe Falyu 
Gueiding Cingwu Wuchuan, (NCC澄清：臺灣「電子防疫服務平臺」為國人自主開發，
未與外國合作，且其運用符合法律規定，請勿誤傳) [NCC Clarification: Taiwan 
“Electronic Epidemic Prevention Service Platform” Was Developed by Taiwanese Without 
Cooperation with Other Nations, and the Operation Was Legal. Please Do Not Be 
Misinformed], NAT’L COMMUNICATION COMM’N (国家通讯委员会) [GUÓJIĀ TŌNGXÙN 
WĚIYUÁNHUÌ] (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/news_detail.aspx?site_co
ntent_sn=8&cate=0&keyword=&is_history=0&pages=0&sn_f=42899. 
242  See, e.g., Mary Hui, How Taiwan Is Tracking 55,000 People Under Home 
Quarantine in Real Time, QUARTZ (Mar. 31, 2020), https://qz.com/1825997/taiwan-phone-
tracking-system-monitors-55000-under-coronavirus-quarantine/. 
243  There are several types of quarantine locations, including residential homes, 
hotels, and university dorms, under the rules promulgated by Taiwan Centers for Disease 
Control Taiwan. See, e.g., COVID-19 FAQs, TAIWAN CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Category/QAPage/SbkmnM5v0OwdDMjJ2tI_xw (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2020); Taiwan Universities to Stop Serving as Quarantine Locations in September, 
TAIWAN NEWS (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3992809; see 
also Taipei City Government’s COVID-19 Epidemic Prevention SOPs, TAIPEI CITY GOV’T, 
https://english.gov.taipei/covid19/News.aspx?n=4BFB872E1F01E0E6&sms=DFD7BFA
E73CC0B5C (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
244  See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, Keji Fangyi Zaituei 
“Yijhih Shentong” & “Shuangsian Gjiansyun” Jhueizong Geli Jianyi (科技防疫，再推
「疫止神通」、「雙向簡訊」追蹤隔離檢疫) [Technology in Pandemic Prevention, to 
promote “the Pandemic Prevention Line Chatbot” & “Bilateral Short Message Service” 
in Tracking the Quarantine], CDC (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail
/-7_x7Lq6ecIzxPyKAGcfyQ?typeid=9. 
245  See Sun Cheng-Wu (孫承武), FangYi wu SiJiao JinJing DianZi WeiLi ZhiHui 
JianKong (防疫無死角 金警電子圍籬智慧監控) [No Dead Angle in Epidemic Prevention 
Police’s Intellectual Surveillance Electronic Fence], CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 28, 
2020), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aloc/202003280143.aspx. 
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her or his quarantine site, the Surveillance System sends a short 
message service (SMS) alert to the individuals, related 
administrators, and the local police on duty.246 The police and the 
civil affairs officers then arrive at the quarantine site to investigate 
its condition and attempt to locate the individual who left.247 If it 
the quarantine order is properly obeyed, no penalty or other 
control measures will be imposed on the individual.248 However, 
if the officers determines that quarantine is violated, a serious 
penalty will follow. 249  This practice presents several complex 
questions regarding the extent of the government’s reach into an 
individuals’ private affairs. For example, is it appropriate for the 
government to electronically “fence” a person in this fashion? Is 
this practice, which essentially fences and freezes civil rights and 
liberties, equivalent to an embrace of authoritarianism? This 
normalization of an arguably draconian regulation in the name of 
public health remains an unanswered question in the realm of 
personal privacy protection. Will this “fencing” and tracking of 
citizens be as destructive to democracy as many privacy violation 
measures advocated for and adopted by governments in the years 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United 
States?250 
3. The “Taiwan social distancing app.” — Taiwan social 
distancing app was developed in mid-March 2020, under 
instruction from Taiwan’s Vice Cabinet Premier Chen Chi-Mai. 
This app uses Bluetooth technology to measure the distance 
 
246  Id. Moreover, the post on March 24, 2020, on the Facebook page of the Ministry 
of the Interior, R.O.C. addressed clearly by stating that: “ZhiYao NiBenRen LiKai DianZi 
WeiLi, WoMen JiuHui MaShang FaJianXun GaiNi, DaDianHua GaiNi” (只要你本人離
開電子圍籬，我們就會馬上發簡訊給你、打電話給你！) [Once you left the quarantine 
site, we will send a SMS to you and call you right away!], see https://www.facebook.com
/moi.gov.tw/photos/a.1046870208674715/3265323943495986/?type=3 (last visited May 
29, 2021). 
247  Id. 
248  See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, JhueiZong Geli 
JianYiJhe WuBi ShouFa WeiJheJjia JhongCcaiFa (居家隔離, 檢疫者務必守法, 違者加
重裁罰) [People Whose Household Isolation or Quarantine Must Comply with the Laws, 
Increased Penalty if Disobeyed], CDC (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/D
etail/U-LF86uDS470CSFM943JwQ?typeid=9. 
249  Id. 
250  See Top Ten Abuses of Power Since 9/11, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/top-ten-abuses-power-911 (last visited May 30, 2021); see also 
G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59 LOY. L. 
REV. 861, 911–15 (2014). 
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between individuals.251  Chen Chi-Mai asserted that the app is 
completely voluntary to use, and the data collected by the app 
would be encrypted and not be used to investigate individuals’ 
locations.252 Still, critics from Taiwan’s civil society have raised 
questions as to whether collecting and processing the data will 
create privacy issues.253 
During May 2021, when Taiwan experienced a huge 
COVID-19 outbreak, the CECC announced that the Taiwan social 
distancing app had been launched for public use.254 The health 
authority has begun upload data to servers maintained by the CDC 
after obtaining consent from confirmed cases. The app will then 
automatically notify app users who have contacted with the 
confirmed case in the past 14 days and ask them to monitor their 
health status.255The government and this app’s developer claimed 
that users’ privacy will be rigorously protected since users do not 
need to register their personal information; moreover, the app uses 
Bluetooth device signal to estimate the physical social 
interactions, 256  and transforms data to anonymous hashed 
identification stored on each individual’s device for up to 28 
 
251  Taiwan Develops Mobile App for Social Distancing, TAIWAN XINWEN (台灣英
文 新 聞) [TAIWAN NEWS] (Apr. 12, 2020), 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3914679; see also Pan Nai-Xin (潘乃欣), 
SheJiao JyuLi App Pu YinSih? Taiwan AI ShiYanShi: Bi OuMeng GuiFan Geng Yan (社交
距離 APP曝隱私？ 台灣 AI實驗室：比歐盟規範更嚴) [Social Distancing App Expose 
Privacy? Taiwan AI Labs: Stricter than the EU Standard], LIÁNHÉ MĚI RÌ XĪNWÉN (聯合
報 ) [UNITED DAILY NEWS] (Apr. 25, 2020), 
https://health.udn.com/health/story/120950/4517830. 
252  Pan, supra note 251. 
253  See, e.g., Taiwan RenQuan CuJinHui (台灣人權促進會) [Taiwan Association 
for Human Rights], GongWei WeiJi zhong RuHe BaoZhang GongMinQuan (公衛危機中，
如何保障公民權) [Protecting Civil Liberties During a Public Health Crisis], MEDIUM 
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://medium.com/@tahr1984/protecting-civil-liberties-during-a-
public-health-crisis-1de3c6d8e724. 
254  See Taiwan Centers for Disease Control Press Release, Taiwan Social 
Distancing App Available for Download; Public Urged to Use App to Receive Information 
About COVID-19 Spread, CDC (May 14, 2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/32-hon2vaFXEQjxIGmqRgw?typeid=158. 
255  Id. See also Taiwan SheJiao JuLi App Chang Jian WenDaJi (「臺灣社交距離
App」常見問答集) [FAQ for "Taiwan Social Distancing App"], CDC (May 25, 2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov.tw/File/Get/Meq89j-Rb_TFblM5dEfmAA. 
256  See Taiwan Social Distancing, GOOGLE PLAY, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=tw.gov.cdc.exposurenotifications&hl=en&g
l=US (last visited May 30, 2021). 
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days. 257 However, the app’s effectiveness is so far limited. 
According to the CDC, although the app already had more than 
800,000 downloads, only 29 new community infections of 
COVID-19 were reported via this app.258  
The M-Police system, the Electronic Fence, and the 
Taiwan social distancing app, are the primary surveillance 
measures that the Taiwan public authorities have employed to 
fight the COVID-19 pandemic. However, these measures raise 
questions about the extent to which society should accept trade-
offs between a public interest in health and safety and individual 
privacy. In light of the legal implications of these pandemic-
response measures, we argue that public health interests can be 
achieved without sacrificing digital privacy and accepting 
widespread surveillance. The M-Police system, the Electronic 
Fence, and the Taiwan social distancing app indeed provide some 
pandemic prevention and control. 259  However, these measures 
may also result in the erosion of individuals’ rights to privacy and 
liberty. In Taiwan, three laws must be examined to properly 
analyze the legal implications of these pandemic response 
measures: the Communicable Disease Control Act (CDC Act), the 
Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for 
Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens (COVID-19 Special 
Act), and the PDPA. 
According to several prominent Taiwanese legal scholars 
who specialize in public health law, “these measures were not 
carefully scrutinized according to the rule of law and 
constitutional principles.”260 They correctly noted that:  
The Personal Data Protection Act sets out rules 
for collecting, processing, and using personal 
 
257  Id.  
258  See Kay Liu, Public Encouraged to Use Contact Tracing App as COVID-19 
Cases Rise, FOCUS TAIWAN (May 14, 2021), https://focustaiwan.tw/sci-
tech/202105140013; COVID-19 Cases Report, TAIWAN CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
https://sites.google.com/cdc.gov.tw/2019-ncov/taiwan (last visited May 30, 2021). 
259  From the outbreak in 2019 to April 2021, the total number of cases in Taiwan 
is 1,057, with 11 deaths and 1,022 recovered. See COVID-19 Cases Report, TAIWAN 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://sites.google.com/cdc.gov.tw/2019-ncov/taiwan 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2021).  
260  See Lin Ching-Fu et al., Reimagining the Administrative State in Times of 
Global Health Crisis: An Anatomy of Taiwan’s Regulatory Actions in Response to the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, 11 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 256, 267 (2020). 
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data, such as lawfulness, purpose limitation, data 
minimization, and data security, but it has long 
been plagued by inflexible legal transplant and 
legal formalism without taking into account local 
contexts and failed to provide a healthy 
regulatory environment.261 
These experts question whether, despite the CDC Act and 
the COVID-19 Special Act authorizing the government to impose 
“other necessary measures,” connecting multiple databases and 
collecting and analyzing surveillance data should actually be 
qualified as one of these “other necessary measures.” 262 
Consequently, they believe the measures cannot survive legal 
scrutiny.263 Similar views have been expressed by other scholars. 
For example, some have expressed concerns that the enforcement 
of regulatory measures regarding data sharing and contact tracing 
has gone beyond the legal limit authorized by the PDPA and the 
CDC Act.264 These scholars therefore recommend that the scope 
of “public interest” as used in the PDPA be further clarified, 
particularly in the context of fighting the battle against COVID-
19.265 Scholars have also argued that neither the CDC Act nor the 
PDPA have defined how the surveillance data may be used, 
transferred, and shared.266 
While most of the technological measures and data 
sharing platforms implemented in response to the pandemic offer 
public health benefits, they also pose grave threats to personal 
autonomy and significant risks to information privacy. China's 
COVID-19 health code application system is an example of 
 
261  Id. 
262  Id. 
263  Id. 
264  See Lee Chung-Hsi (李崇僖), Zai WunYi ManYan jhong JianShih GeZih BaoHu 
FaJhih (在瘟疫蔓延中檢視個資保護法制) [Examines the Legal System of Personal Data 
Protection in the Spread of The Plague], 387 TAIWAN. L.J. 39, 40 (2020). 
265  Id. at 41. 
266  Lin Shin-Rou (林欣柔), FangYi? FangYi? JiBing JianCe JieChuJhe JhueiZong 
yu GeRen ZihSyun YinSih jhih PingHeng (防疫？妨疫？疾病監測、接觸者追蹤與個人
資訊隱私之平衡) [Epidemic Prevention? Impair the Epidemic? The Balance of Disease 
Surveillance, Contact Tracking and Personal Information Privacy], 387 TAIWAN. L.J. 45,
 50 (2020). 
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raising concerns over privacy.267 For technology-assisted efforts 
like tracing travel history and monitoring and enforcing self-
isolation restrictions to be effective, they must be deployed by 
trusted legal advisers. Contact tracing must also be planned with 
extensive safeguards to protect data privacy at the outset. Without 
safeguards, “individuals may be unwilling to participate.” 268 
Furthermore, collecting data in a “privacy-respecting way” 
requires “legal, organizational, and computational safeguards” to 
successfully manage the remaining risks the population faces.269  
As Professor Ryan Calo270 highlighted in his testimony to 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
in April 2020:  
There are myriad potential applications of 
technology to the fight against the novel 
coronavirus—too many to detail here. Each 
carries with it a measure of promise and of 
peril . . . does this intervention do enough in the 
fight against the novel coronavirus to offset its 
impact on privacy, civil liberties, or other 
important values? I submit that not all proposed 
interventions will meet this simple test.271 
 
267  See e.g., Helen Davidson, China's Coronavirus Health Code Apps Raise 
Concerns Over Privacy, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/w
orld/2020/apr/01/chinas-coronavirus-health-code-apps-raise-concerns-over-privacy. 
According to this post, The China Health Code application system, which follow people to 
move around after lockdown, have become an integral part of Chinese authorities’ 
management of citizens. Raise concerns over privacy by lacking transparency over how 
the app works and what data it is storing. 
268  Brett Milano, How Much Access to Data Should Be Permitted During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic?, HARV. L. TODAY (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://today.law.harvard.edu/how-much-access-to-data-should-be-permitted-during-
covid-19-pandemic. 
269  Id.  
270  Professor Ryan Calo is the Lane Powell and D. Wayne Gittinger Professor at 
the University of Washington School of Law. His research fields are Privacy Law and Law 
and Technology. For the past few years, he has been a pioneer in Artificial Intelligence and 
Law. See Ryan Calo, UNIV. WASH. SCHOOL OF LAW, https://www.law.uw.edu/directory/f
aculty/calo-ryan (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).  
271  Enlisting Big Data in the Fight Against Coronavirus Before the S. Comm. On 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 117 Cong. 5 (2020) (statement of Ryan Calo, 
Associate Professor, University of Washington), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/servic
es/files/D069F0C0-2B67-4999-AC75-5BC41D14D00C. 
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The debate over the appropriate amount of governmental 
access to personal data should be permitted during the COVID-19 
pandemic will continue. Public health, economic recovery, and 
personal privacy are incommensurable. However, there is no need 
for these goals to suffer at the expense of each other.272  
As Professor Lawrence Gostin 273  suggested, “it is 
important to carefully balance public health with rights to privacy 
and liberty.”274 He further explained that “exercising public health 
powers unmoored from constitutional rights is unwarranted.”275 
As the Constitutional Court of Taiwan has made clear, the right to 
privacy is protected by the Taiwan’s Constitution.276 Therefore, 
Taiwanese legislators and policymakers must consider and 
encapsulate these constitutional privacy rights in the rules they 
make and enforce, regardless of a pressing global emergency. 
They must ensure that partnerships with technology or 
telecommunications companies respect privacy when they 
conduct data analysis.277 They must also ensure that justice and 
democracy are not unduly sacrificed or burdened in exchange for 
health and security.278  
In Taiwan, the current laws and regulations underpinning 
data sharing and surveillance measures in reaction to the COVID-
19 crisis include the CDC Act, the COVID-19 Special Act, and 
PDPA.279 The PDPA specifically is supposed to play a key role in 
 
272  See Martin Eiermann, There Is No Devil’s Bargain Between Privacy and Public 
Health, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-
04-13/there-no-devils-bargain-between-privacy-and-public-
health?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=fb_daily_soc&utm_source=facebook_posts.  
273  Lawrence O. Gostin is a Professor at Georgetown University. Professor Gostin 
directs the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law and is the Founding 
O’Neill Chair in Global Health Law. See Lawrence O. Gostin, GEORGETOWN LAW, 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lawrence-o-gostin/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
274  See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Presidential Powers and Response to COVID-
19, 323 JAMA 1547, 1548 (2020).  
275  Id. 
276  See Interpretation No. 689, surpa note 178.  
277  Milano, supra note 268. 
278  See, e.g., Danielle Allen et al., White Paper, Securing Justice, Health, and 
Democracy Against the COVID-19 Threat, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS 4 (2020), 
https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/corrected_white_paper_1.pdf. 
279  CECC Announces Guidelines for Contact-Information-Based Measures for 
COVID-19 to Protect Personal Data and Facilitate Outbreak Investigations, 
WEISHENGFULIBU JIBING GUANZHISHU (衛生福利部疾病管制署臺灣) [TAIWAN CENTER 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL] (May 28, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/IID
yyLqebEgsqQTkb1dUxg?typeid=158. 
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the protection of data privacy in this challenging time. However, 
it is apparent the current PDPA is limited, and the need to surveil, 
test, and track citizens has not been balanced with legitimate 
privacy concerns as Taiwan public authorities attempt to contain 
the spread of the highly infectious disease.  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING INFORMATION 
PRIVACY IN TAIWAN’S BIG DATA FUTURE 
A. Change the Mindset and Establish a Framework 
The above scenarios describe controversial instances 
where data has been released to the public and exemplify that 
Taiwan is facing a crucial turning point in its open data policies. 
Each case displays the lack of a comprehensive privacy protection 
program, the current flawed privacy protection law, and the 
governmental and judicial failure to recognize the importance of 
individual privacy protection. Each of these factors contributes to 
a heightened risk of ongoing privacy violations in Taiwan.  
To rectify the mistakes that have been made while 
implementing Taiwan’s open data programs, government agencies 
and private companies must reorient their mindset. Both public 
and private sectors must realize that when citizens disclose 
personal data, they often have no choice but to give out this data 
and retain no control over the flow of their information.280 This 
means that these individuals often have a reasonable expectation 
that their information will be processed and used.281 Consequently, 
it is therefore reasonable to insist that government agencies and 
companies should bear the responsibility of protecting the 
personal data that they have been entrusted with and show 
meticulous care toward managing this data.282 By building robust 
information privacy protection mechanisms, the government and 
private sector actors should not only safeguard data subjects’ 
privacy, but they should shield those responsible for open data 
programs from potential litigation risks arising from legal 
 
280  See Ho, supra note 94, at 145; see also Chang, supra note 55, at 147. 
281  See Briefing Paper on Data and Privacy, supra note 201. 
282  See Teresa Scassa, Issues in Open Data: Privacy, in THE STATE OF OPEN DATA: 
HISTORIES AND HORIZONS, 339, 340 (Tim Davies et al., eds., 2019). 
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uncertainties, as illustrated by the Tsai et al. case.283  
Instead of downplaying the importance of privacy 
protection and viewing privacy protection as a hurdle impeding 
open data initiatives, government agencies and private entities 
should consider privacy issues at the outset. These actors could 
formulate open data strategies at the start and incorporate privacy 
risk assessments into every step of their planning – from data 
collecting to data processing to data reuses. This would not only 
enhance privacy protection for individuals, but it could also prove 
beneficials for the government agencies and private entities, as it 
allows them to address and solve any future issues before they 
arise. Dedicated privacy offices or advisory committees could also 
be implemented and would prove greatly beneficial. They could 
provide professional opinions and develop guidelines when 
agencies or companies make open data policies. The offices or 
committees could also undertake risk assessments before 
releasing data and could monitor privacy protection measures 
throughout an open data initiative.284 For example, in situations 
where a government agency must weigh public interests against 
an individuals’ right to privacy or when an agency considers what 
level of data de-identification is required, a committee or office 
could offer more scrupulous balancing tests and more detailed 
advice.285  
B. Revamp the Privacy Law and the Related 
Administration Rules 
A set of sophisticated data protection regulations is the 
bedrock of a robust information privacy protection framework and 
 
283  See, e.g., Tsai et al. v. National Health Insurance Administration, 102 NianDu 
Su Zi No. 36 (102 年度訴字第 36 號判決) (Taipei GaoDeng XingZheng FaYuan (臺北高
等行政法院) [Taipei Administrative High Court], 2014) (Taiwan); Tsai et al. v. National 
Health Insurance Administration, 106 NianDu Pan Zi No. 54 (106 年度判字第 54 號判決) 
(ZuiGao XingZheng FaYuan (最高行政法院) [Supreme Administrative Court], 2017) 
(Taiwan). 
284  See generally Charles D. Raab, Information Privacy, Impact Assessment, and 
the Place of Ethics, 37 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 1 (2020). 
285  When conducting the human rights impact assessment, the committee serves to 
contextualize the rights and values in terms of the specific and local situations that are 
under assessment, to consider conflicting interest, and to assess and mitigate risks. Id. at 12. 
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the key to a successful open data program. 286  This paper has 
discussed four issues that must addressed by the current data 
protection regulations in Taiwan: (1) the protection of sensitive 
data; (2) de-identification requirements; (3) the right to consent 
and opt-out; and (4) the ambiguity of “public interest.”  
To guarantee data subjects’ right to information privacy, a 
PDPA amendment must clarify who bears the responsibility of de-
identification between the data controllers and data processors, 
offer more sophisticated regulations of de-identification, and put 
forth consent requirements for different kinds of data sets. An 
amendment must also provide an “opt-out” device to provide 
adequate means to fulfill the important right to consent and opt-
out. Finally, an amendment should introduce a more 
comprehensive framework and clear guidelines to be considered 
when evaluating whether data use is necessary to further the 
public interest. This could include a balancing test for when 
government agencies or private companies must weigh and 
evaluate this “public interest” against individuals’ right to privacy. 
With the vast number of public and private interests 
involved in open data programs, it is unlikely that a single 
provision in the law could cover all circumstances and scenarios. 
It would be impossible to enumerate all situations that are feasibly 
related to public interests or all methods of de-identification. 
However, the law and any subsequent enforcement rules could 
still provide the necessary rationales and basic instructions for the 
protection of different kinds of personal data. 
The global trend of data regulation has been to distinguish 
different kinds of data, and then impose various de-identification 
requirements accordingly.287 This trend can be seen in the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that was passed in 2016 and 
 
286  See European Data Portal, Analytical Report 3: Open Data and Privacy, at 3 
(July 15, 2020), https://www.europeandataportal.eu/sites/default/files/open_data_and_pri
vacy_v1_final_clean.pdf. In this Report, it is asserted that Open Data is an important means 
of increasing the access of data to citizens, companies, and civil society, and can promote 
economic growth, scientific research, and political and corporate accountability. A 
successful and sustainable Open Data program should be based on three pillars: (1) morally, 
the data publisher should consider the privacy of data subjects; (2) legally, data protection 
law must be respected, and (3) pragmatically, public confidence has to be maintained. 
287  See generally Mehmet Kayaalp, Modes of De-identification, AMIA ANNUAL 
SYMPOSIUM (2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319914283_Modes_of_De-
identification. 
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officially implemented in European Union member countries in 
May 2018. The GDPR implicitly categorizes different kinds of 
data as identified and de-identified data and demands different 
levels of de-identification for each category. 288  In the United 
States, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) also creates rationales, related standards, and two 
different paths of de-identification for healthcare providers or 
those who deal with personal health information to follow.289 After 
complying with the regulations to reduce privacy risks, the data 
controllers or users can make the secondary use of the sensitive 
data. 290  The Taiwanese government could follow suit and 
implement a similar scheme with justifiable rationales, reasonable 
standards, and a sophisticated de-identification mechanism for 
healthcare providers and data users to comply with.  
It is never easy to determine whether public interests or 
individual privacy should prevail. Other countries and 
jurisdictions are faced with this same issue and have made efforts 
to create rationales and put more stringent privacy protection 
mechanisms into existing regulations as complementary 
measures.291 For instance, the GDPR, like the PDPA, allows data 
controllers and processors to use personal data for purposes that 
are beyond their original collection purpose without obtaining 
consents from the data subjects, if the purpose is for public 
interests such as “statistical purposes or scientific research.”292 
However, the GDPR also asks member states to specifically define 
what the “public interest” is and imposes more detailed 
 
288  The GDPR text itself does not explicitly label these categories of data, but they 
can still be implied from the clauses and be matched with proper level of de-identification. 
See Mike Hintze, Viewing the GDPR Through a De-Identification Lens: A Tool for 
Compliance, Clarification, and Consistency, 8 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 86, 87 (2018). 
289  See How Can Covered Entities Use and Disclose Protected Health Information 
for Research and Comply with the Privacy Rule?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Feb. 02, 2007), 
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_08.asp. 
290  See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., Guidance Regarding Methods for De-
identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (2015), https://www.hhs.gov/hi
paa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/#coveredentities (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2017). 
291  See Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, General 
Data Protection Regulation, arts. 89(1), 50(b), 2016 J.O. (L 119) 1 (EU). 
292  Id. 
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requirements for data safeguards accordingly.293 By comparing 
with the GDPR’s stringent regulatory mechanism with the ETC’s 
de-identification process of merely removing license plate 
numbers, for example, it becomes abundantly clear that Taiwan 
must create a more sophisticated scheme for data de-identification. 
This is particularly necessary to create an additional layer of 
protection for data subjects in instances when public interests are 
found to trump the individual right to privacy.294 
Canada’s information protection regulations provide a 
relevant example.295 When balancing public interests against the 
protection of data subjects’ health information, some provinces 
demand that research ethics boards (REBs) assess whether public 
interests override should apply to disclosure for health research 
purpose.296  Some even include a list of non-exhaustive public 
interests that REBs should consider in their regulations.297 Both 
the GDPR and Canada’s regulations show that the balance 
between public interests and the right to individual privacy is an 
issue worthy of deliberation by legislators, and the tension can 
only be tackled by creating more comprehensive privacy 
protection mechanisms. Institutional arrangements to help balance 
individual and public interests, such as REBs, might be a plausible 
mechanism for the Taiwanese government to implement as they 
aim to create a regime that better protects data privacy.  
Even though open data programs provide several benefits, 
these benefits remain hazardous if the programs are implemented 
without thorough plans for privacy protection. A comprehensive 
 
293  General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 264, art. 89(1) (“Processing for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or 
statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this 
Regulation, for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure 
that technical and organizational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure 
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those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer 
permits the identification of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.”). 
294  See generally Gauthier Chassang, The Impact of the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation on Scientific Research, 11 ECANCER 709 (2017), https://ecancer.or
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295  See, e.g., Ubaka Ogbogu & Sarah Burningham, Privacy Protection and Genetic 
Research: Where Does the Public Interest Lie?, 51 ALTA. L. REV. 471, 482–83 (2014). 
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privacy protection plan would require the recognition of the 
importance of privacy protection, a robust framework for privacy 
protection, and comprehensive legal mechanisms. It is undeniable 
that Taiwan’s government and the civil society are committed to 
open data, and their efforts have been recognized. However, to 
keep the momentum going in a positive, balanced way, 
strengthening data privacy protection is an urgent must. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we analyzed the open data and privacy 
protection regime in Taiwan through two steps: (1) examining the 
history of open data and the PDPA and (2) identifying the key 
controversies raised by the PDPA. Next, we discuss four primary 
issues presented by the PDPA: (1) the protection of sensitive data, 
(2) de-identification, (3) the right to consent and opt-out, and (4) 
the ambiguity of “public interest.” Case studies of the ETC, the 
Taiwan NHI research databases, and the recent data sharing and 
surveillance practices to prevent the spread of COVID-19 were 
presented to showcase both the urgent need to address the PDPA’s 
flaws and the Taiwan’s perspective on the privacy perils of open 
data and data sharing. 
Open data is a way to facilitate innovation. To ameliorate 
privacy concerns arising from disease control, epidemic 
prevention, or numerous other scenarios, it is important to 
understand why revealing exceedingly detailed information is 
unwarranted. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020 and 
put the global population at risk, public authorities in Taiwan 
collaborated with information technology professionals to utilize 
open data and keep citizens informed. 298  However, the 
government must not employ a “public interest” rationale solely 
to disguise or justify inappropriate uses of personal data or 
illegitimate surveillance of citizens. Though it is difficult to 
balance privacy protections against the public interest, the 
Taiwanese government must remain focused on creating and 
 
298  See, e.g., Taiwan Can Help, https://taiwancanhelp.us/ (last visited Apr. 16, 
2020). (creating the online system of the face mask inventories at drugstores in real time is 
an example of community collaboration of the information technology professionals in 
Taiwan utilizing open data and keep citizens informed). 
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implementing regulatory efforts that focus on limiting the scope 
and detail of individual data to be collected, used, and disclosed. 
In today’s world, combining databases both domestically 
in Taiwan and on an international scale can bring together 
extensive amounts of individuals’ data.299 Therefore, this article 
suggests that, instead of viewing privacy issues as a stumbling 
block, legislation should focus on building robust regulatory 
privacy protection mechanisms to foster innovation and enhance 
open data initiatives and their goals of data sharing. Even under 
the PDPA’s current regulatory regime, the Taiwanese population 
has witnessed public authorities and corporations misuse citizens’ 
data and risk their privacy while attempting to tackle a public 
health emergency. 
There is no doubt that sacrificing individual privacy 
protections for health and safety purposes may result in greater, 
perhaps even more authoritarian, governmental control and 
greater control by technology and telecommunications companies 
with undue influence.300 To avoid this unfortunate and undesirable 
result, the Taiwanese legal landscape should be reformed to 
facilitate regulatory audits and ensure that misuse and abuse of 
personal data do not occur when global emergencies, like the 
COVID-19 pandemic, transpire.301  
Lastly, we offer recommendations for reform. We propose 
implementing guidelines for de-identification requirements, 
clarifying the definition of the public interest exemption in the 
PDPA, and adding an opt-out mechanism as crucial first steps for 
 
299  See, e.g., Anca D. Chirita, Global Platform Dominance: Abusive or 
Competition on the Merits?, DURHAM L.SCH. RSCH. PAPER (Oct. 31, 2019), https://paper
s.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3540987. 
300  See generally Joint Statement: States Use of Digital Surveillance Technologies 
to Fight Pandemic Must Respect Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol30/2081/2020/en/. 
301  For instance, rather than disclosing precise locations of an infected individual 
to the public, the regulatory efforts should focus on less granular data that could be 
disclosed, with the same effect on tracking and quarantine. Concerns the lack of 
transparency from the government could be raised, and such concerns could be addressed 
by devising a suitable privacy-preserving methodology that also ensures trustworthiness. 
See e.g., Sangchul Park et. al., Information Technology–Based Tracing Strategy in 
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reform. Further, in shaping their open data policies, Taiwan should 
undertake risk assessments before releasing any data and monitor 
privacy protection measures throughout the life of any open data 
initiative, including at the outset. Additionally, a privacy office or 
advisory committee may be beneficial to provide professional 
opinions and develop sensible guidelines. Only by creating a 
trustworthy privacy protection system will Taiwanese civil society 
begin to feel comfortable allowing the collection, processing, use, 
and reuse of their personal data without worrying about an 
invasion in their private lives. While Taiwan has certainly hopped 
on the open data train in recent years, the country still has several 
changes to implement before the track is smoothly followed. 
